Toolbox: 9. Preventive Deployment

Tool Category C: Military Measures
9. Preventive Deployment

Description		The UN Security Council or other international organization deploys third party troops preventively, as a deterrent, before a conflict erupts or to keep an incipient from degenerating into sustained, acute violence.

*Objectives*		Preventive deployment is a proactive measure designed to facilitate a political solution by avoiding or limiting violent conflict. Preventive deployment underscores international concern with and commitment to react to a situation. Preventive deployment is a deterrent, and a preventive deployment of peace-keepers is normally not designed to take on an attack. This deterrence function is reinforced when a stronger force is kept in reserve to react to any violation of whatever ground rules have been set; preventive deployment here includes the notion of trip-wire. Preventive deployment provides conflicting parties with a solution that can be mutually acceptable and in some cases face-saving.

*Expected outcome or impact*		Successful preventive deployment averts the escalation of an emerging conflict while the presence of third party troops on the ground reassures local communities and authorities and prevents local human rights abuses.

*Relationship to conflict prevention and mitigation*		Preventive deployment differs from traditional peacekeeping which typically supports or enforces a political solution that has already been reached. Preventive deployment, on the other hand, usually occurs without a settlement to govern the deployment of the multinational force. Preventive deployment of peacekeepers differs from preventive deployment of lightly armed military observers: deploying company-size units represents a heavier commitment on the part of the international community, raises the stakes for potential violators, and allows for more thorough activities.

Implementation *Organizers*		Preventive deployment is organized by the member states of multilateral organizations, both international—the United Nations—and regional—the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the case of the UN, key players are the Secretary-General, the veto-bearing members of the Security Council and the troop-contributing nations themselves, especially those with strategic lift and rapid deployment capabilities.

*Participants*		The main participants are frontline military units from troop-contributing countries, both infantry and specialized such as hospital, movement control, or engineering units.

*Activities*		Troops in preventive deployment handle the following tasks. · Monitor and report on activities that undermine stability and good will such as infiltration, provocative behavior and arm smuggling. · Monitor and assist in establishing law and order · Monitor and in some cases intervene to prevent abuses against civilian populations · Assist in delivering humanitarian assistance and social services such as water and road maintenance.

*Cost considerations*		Preventive deployment is expensive. It often involves first world troops; it requires heavy back-up support, extensive logistics, modern monitoring and surveillance technologies and, in some cases, offensive capabilities. At the same time, first world troop contributors who are also major donors are often willing to make funds available. The costs of preventive deployment are offset in part by averted conflict-related expenditures.

*Other resource considerations*		Troop availability can be an issue, especially for first world troops. Preventive deployment can involve casualties, a cost that some armies and societies will bear more readily than others.

*Set-up time*		Preventive deployment requires political negotiations to create a desirable environment for the deployment, both internationally and among the conflicting parties. These negotiations can be lengthy. Deployment itself is usually swift.

*Timeframe* *to see results*		The exit strategy to finalize preventive deployment is often less clear than for traditional peacekeeping missions with their peace agreements and often explicit timelines for deployment. Results—averted conflict—are hard to measure. "Hot" conflicts provide compelling reasons to stay. Yet in the absence of negotiated settlements or strong tensions, trigger elements are harder to assess; ironically, this all the more true if the preventive deployment has been successful in dampening tensions.

Conflict context *Stages of conflict*		Preventive deployment is normally considered in cases of an emerging threat—a crisis in its pre-violent phase—or in cases of a violent situation that presents potential for much greater violence. Preventive deployment is also an option to keep violent conflict from breaking out anew in cases where violence has subsided but where the conflict is not yet resolved. In these cases troops can be deployed to keep the peace or the mandate for preventive forces already on the ground can be extended.

*Type of conflict*		Preventive deployment can achieve results in inter-state, intra-state, factional or community-based conflicts. To warrant the attention of international or regional organizations, conflicts requiring preventive deployment are generally of a certain magnitude, involving major political upheaval and putting the future of large populations at risk. Typically, these conflicts involve groups competing for state control or fighting for secession.

*Causes of conflict*		Preventive deployment addresses the operational causes of a conflict such as communitarian violence at the local level, tension between opposing forces, border incursions, and arms smuggling.

*Prerequisites*		Preventive deployment is an appropriate policy tool when the following conditions are present. · A clear, emerging threat is compelling enough to prod into action those capable of organizing preventive deployment. · Levels of violence are manageable enough that the situation can be stabilized and that the forces deployed are not exposed to an unacceptable level of risk. · The conflicting parties accept the preventive deployment. · International diplomatic and military commitment and political will is sufficient to garner the troops and funds for the deployment. · The preventive deployment force responds to elements of the conflicting parties’ domestic agenda.

Past practice *Outside the Greater Horn*		Macedonia: UNPROFOR/UNPREDEP. At the end of 1992, after fighting had engulfed the former Yugoslav republics of Croatia and Bosnia and tensions had mounted in the Serbian autonomous region of Kosovo, Macedonia’s leadership expressed concerns to UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali that the fighting might spill over into that republic. The main worries were Serbian intervention and the likelihood of Albanian involvement in Western Macedonia if conflict erupted in Kosovo. Macedonia, with no armed forces to speak of since its secession from the Yugoslav Federation, sought both help in border-monitoring and a credible deterrent to external aggression.The UN and the great powers were concerned that Macedonia could degenerate and become another Bosnia but with greater international repercussions, involving Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, Turkey and Serbia. Macedonia was in the early phases of the build-up to conflict: the potential pay-off for preventive action was clear. The SG requested that UNPROFOR—the UN force in the former Yugoslavia—mount an exploratory mission to assess the practicability of a preventive deployment of peacekeepers in Macedonia. The UN carried out simultaneous extensive consultations with political players in Macedonia. The UN decided to deploy heavily armed first world infantry rather than lightly armed or unarmed military observers, a more standard UN response in this type of situation, highlighting the deployment’s deterrent element. UNPROFOR, renamed UNPREDEP in 1995, eventually deployed a battalion of 700 Nordic troops, joined by 300 US troops. The US troops added considerable political credibility to the operation as a whole. The mechanized infantry was supplemented by an Indonesian engineering platoon, 35 UN Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) and 35 UN Military Observers (UNMOs). The Macedonia deployment was based on four justifications: · To address internal instability and any external threat to the integrity of Macedonia’s territory. · To stymie developments that might further undermine stability in the former Yugoslavia. · To support the CSCE (Council—now Organization—for Security and Cooperation in Europe) mission in Macedonia. · To meet a member state’s request for assistance. UNPREDEP’s civilian mandate is to keep open channels with official and unofficial sources in the country in order to monitor the political, economic and social conditions. The military mandate is to monitor Macedonia’s borders with Albania and Serbia, the latter presenting particular challenges because for the most part it is unmarked and because Serbia only recognized Macedonia’s independence in April 1996, after the preventive deployment began. The monitoring activities are carried out from 24 Observation Posts (OPs) with outreach activities that include airborne, mounted and foot patrols. UNMOs monitor border crossing points and CIVPOLs keep contacts with local police and inhabitants in villages. UNPREDEP offers three benefits. · It serves as a monitoring body that helps inform the UN, the US and the EU about developments in a sensitive part of the world. · It serves as go-between among the parties, especially Yugoslavia and Macedonia. · It is a political and a military deterrent. This preventive deployment was possible because the political will was present, the stakes were high, the actual risk of violence was low and the West was concerned with correcting the passivity demonstrated at the beginning of the Bosnian crisis. UNFICYP, UNAVEM III, IFOR. UNFICYP (the UN operation in Cyprus) is an example of a traditional peacekeeping deployment whose repeatedly renewed mandate has evolved into a more preventive role. The UN was concerned that withdrawing UNFICYP might lead to conflict, either because the force is no longer present to fill its peacekeeping role or because withdrawal might undermine the status quo, if only by sending the message that international interest in the problem is waning. The cases of UNAVEM III and IFOR—and one could cite others—are less clear. These forces were meant to address more recent conflicts. The peace accords that led to their deployment—the Lusaka protocol and the Dayton Peace Agreements respectively—continue to govern their presence. Yet the decisions to renew UNAVEM’s mandate and give IFOR a successor force (still impressive though drawn down) were based on fears that withdrawing significant international presence would lead to violence. These deployments were continued in a preventive mindset.

Evaluation *Strengths*		The high level of political commitment and the deliberate nature of the operations are clear indications to conflicting parties that the international community and troop-contributing nations mean business. Preventive deployment is well-suited to large crises. Preventive deployment linked to diplomatic and political activities is a comprehensive tool that can both intimidate potential conflict-mongerers and help build trust between the parties.

Weaknesses

Preventive deployment does not address a conflict’s structural causes.

A multinational force’s stabilizing and reassuring presence may push conflicting parties toward intransigence, delaying a political settlement.Preventive deployment requires a high degree of political will on the part of troop-contributing nations and can be hard to sell to domestic constituencies precisely because there is no crisis that appears to warrant the expense. This limits its use.

Preventive deployment can undermine conflict resolution if it is not linked to diplomatic activity.

The preventive force might get involved in the conflict, often on the side of the weaker side.

*Lessons learned*		The configuration and rules of engagement for a preventive deployment depend on the conflicting parties’ susceptibility to international opinion and ability to control their forces on the ground. The troops involved must serve as a convincing deterrent, including in environments where the consent of all parties remains unclear. This means that forces on the ground must be robust and that the contributing nation’s commitment has international importance. These troops must perform duties that are more complex than those involved in a straightforward peacekeeping mission. Preventive deployment is most effective if it occurs along conflict fault lines; the clearest of these are international boundaries but they can also be internal conflict lines. The deployment can take place on one side of the confrontation line at the request of one party, usually the more vulnerable one, or on both sides is both parties agree to it. Acceptance of the force by the parties in conflict. While bilateral consent—consent by both parties—is preferable, preventive deployment is more likely than traditional peacekeeping to consider unilateral acceptance—acceptance by only one party to the conflict, typically the potential victim of aggression. Preventive deployment can also be based on acquiescence rather than consent, where consent is the explicit and willful acceptance of the preventive force and acquiescence, on the other hand, may be implicit and not go far beyond an absence of opposition. As with traditional peacekeeping, real acquiescence may be preferable to pro forma consent that does not translate into real political will. The preventive force’s effectiveness in dampening tension and building trust at the local community and tactical military levels depends on the cooperation of the parties to the conflict. Diplomatic consent can be meaningless in the absence of true operational cooperation on the ground.Agencies might consider preventive deployment without consent by any party if the international community perceived the stakes as high enough. Non-consensual preventive deployment requires compelling firepower and/or friendly relations between the preventive force and the parties on the ground. International commitment. Political will is the central element to preventive deployment. Preventive deployment is expensive; these costs can increase when first world troops are fielded, meaning more equipment and more of an "over-kill" mentality. Effective deterrence requires mobility, equipment and credibility as a fighting force. This implies costly air assets and possibly out-of-theater back-up forces. Preventive deployment can be costly in terms of political capital. Events can evolve unpredictably; participating governments may have to choose between fighting and possibly sustaining casualties and withdrawing and paying a price in international and domestic credibility. Preventive deployment can be a hard sell to domestic constituencies for whom it is difficult (or inconvenient) to understand the potential price of inaction. Operational lessons learned. · The force must be credible and dissuasive in its on-the-ground fire capacity and its over-the-horizon call-in capabilities. It should have the means and resolve to implement "show-of-force" operations. · The ratio between forces in-theater and over-the-horizon should not be too low: the force on the ground must be large enough to show true commitment on the part of troop-contributing nations and organizing institutions. Too tenuous a trip-wire will undermine the exercise’s credibility. · The force should have access to modern monitoring, surveillance and communications equipment. · The force should be highly mobile to enhance its operational effectiveness as an interpositioned monitoring force and to ensure its own reaction abilities. · The force should be highly integrated with the mission’s political elements and should be backed up by civil affairs, military observer and CIVPOL components that can supplement some of the contact work that might be more difficult for regular infantry units to carry out. Pulling out. The Macedonian case demonstrates how the hypothetical element in preventive deployments can make exit strategies hard to define. It is difficult to determine how solid "normalcy" is and to pinpoint the role of the preventive force in preventing conflict.

References and resources		Ackermann, Alice and Antonio Pala, "From Peacekeeping to Preventive Deployment: A Study of the United Nations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," in European Security, Vol.5, No.1, Spring 1996. Archer, Clive, "Conflict Prevention in Europe: The Case of the Northern States and Macedonia," in Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 29(4), Sage, London, 1994. Evans, Gareth, Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards (NSW), Australia, 1993. Hong, Mark, "On Preventive Deployment," lecture by Singapore’s Deputy Representative to the UN, to UNITAR, March 1993. International Crisis Group (ICG), Report to the Board on the Current Situation in Burundi, the Risk of Genocide and International Reaction to the Proposal to Establish a Multinational Military Intervention Force, London, April 1996. Lund, Michael, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC, 1996. Tharoor, Shashi, The Concept of Preventive Deployment in the 1990s, United Nations paper, 1996. Wranker, Bo, "Preventive Diplomacy: Military Component," paper presented by UNPREDEP’s FC to the workshop An Agenda for Preventive Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, Skopje, October 1996.

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