Description

Objectives

· To turn the military into a more national institution by making both the officer corps and ranks more representative of the country's population.

· To make the military more loyal to the state and less subject to regional, ethnic, or personal interests.

· To help allay security fears of previously unrepresented groups who feel the military is unresponsive to their security needs and have suffered abuse from security forces.

 

Expected outcome or impact

Relationship to conflict prevention and mitigation

Security force composition can be an explosive issue in an ethnically polarized society. A national military force dominated by a particular ethnic, regional or political group undermines the army’s and government’s legitimacy and can be a major source of insecurity to un/under-represented groups or of violent conflict within the state. On the other hand, an integrated force is potentially less provocative—both in action and in perception—especially when the military enforce internal security.

In a state with high tension between two or more major groups, deliberate successful integration of the armed forces can help reduce the perceived threat to each other and contribute to reconciliation. In other cases, coexistence of a national army with various non-government armed forces is potentially destabilizing.

Integration and restructuring efforts are often accompanied by force reduction or demobilization, especially of troops in the over-represented categories, or by moves to professionalize, retrain and reform the forces. These interventions are profiled in further depth elsewhere in this section.

Implementation

Organizers

Participants

Activities

The first step is for group leaders to begin negotiating the terms and procedures of force integration and restructuring. The negotiation process must be ongoing and continue throughout the implementation period as unforeseen issues arise and circumstances change.

The negotiation process could possibly be assisted by holding an informal conference on the nature of the new army, to be attended by academics, senior political leaders and senior military officers from the non-government sides and an unofficial delegation of government miliary and political leaders. Attendees would be tasked with working on joint proposals and broad agreements on aspects of the new force, such as the type of force and its primary roles and characteristics, political boundaries and guidelines, accountability to parliament, and its subordination. Even more contentious issues such as size and proportions of representation can wait for more formal negotiations.

The opposition groups must accept having their members integrated into the national army. They are likely to be sensitive to being "absorbed" into the existing government army, and will likely favor having all forces join a new, renamed force structure, with a new mission and doctrine.

Civil and military parties negotiate and establish procedures for follow-through on issues such as:

· Which forces to include in integration—whether to include armed formations not officially under the control of any recognized or identifiable political organization such as community self-defense units and paramilitary groups.

· Overall force strength and the representation of each force or group; percentages of the overall force to be provided by each side. Various schemes can be worked out, such as an equal percentage for each group, or proportional representation according to the population of each group. There may be agreement to an initially low percentage of the new groups, to be increased by a certain rate in coming years.

· How senior positions and commands in the integrated force will be distributed—rank structure, rank proportions from each group, and procedures and criteria for converting the rank of each group's members (especially from former non-government forces). Rank representation and conversion will be a flashpoint for discord. To increase representation at all ranks, including the command structure, requires a policy of unbiased promotion and possibly affirmative action. The two sides may agree that for the first few years, command of most or all major units will be held by professionally trained officers of the former government army, then over the longer term as greater numbers of officers from the non-government group are trained they may assume a greater percentage of command positions.

· Screen officers for reliability according to their support for the peace process and participation in past human rights abuses. Former participants in coup attempts and human rights abuses should be discharged or demobilized.

· When, who, and how to demobilize—an existing military generally has a limited absorptive capacity at all levels to incorporate the additional troops needed to represent various groups in society. Integration efforts require that a large proportion of the national army’s dominant group be demobilized. This reduction in forces can either occur either prior to, simultaneously with, or follow the force integration process. This timing decision will be influenced partly by political issues—how strongly the two or more sides object to their forces being down-sized, the relative strength of the political leadership and the amount of civilian control over the military—as well as by technical factors—finances, training capacity, basing facilities, and the presence of peacekeeping forces.

· Duration of the integration process—to find the balance between speed, necessary for short-term political stability, versus the time needed to do it properly. One specialist recommends a 2-3 year integration period for a case such as Burundi.

· Interim status—decisions must be made early on concerning applicants to the new force, especially those from irregular armies, including what they will do pending word on their status, training and placement, where they will stay, under what conditions, whether they will wear uniforms and whether they will be paid. Limited training capacity and facilities can extend this interim period for a year or more. Failure to make such provisions can destroy troops' confidence and jeopardize the entire process.

· Interim security—decisions must be made as to how the country’s internal and external security will be maintained during the integration and possibly demobilization process. One alternative is to deploy an international peacekeeping force.

· The new military's role, mission, and doctrine.

· Deployment of forces, including which forces from which groups will be stationed in which regions.

· Recruitment policies, including whether recruitment should be restricted to members of established armed forces.

· Training policies, procedures and resources.

· Personnel screening and selection criteria (professional qualifications) applicants must meet, such as military or job experience, literacy, education, age, health standards, physical characteristics, criminal record, and human rights record. These criteria can be divisive and are less straightforward than first appears. The more conventional (especially former government) forces will favor formal education and formal military training, especially for officers, while members of the unconventional forces will insist on the merits of their alternative military training and skills and protest that having had to disrupt formal education while serving their cause (or being denied such opportunities for political and socioeconomic reasons) should not disqualify them from future military service.

· Procedure for selecting and inducting personnel into the integrated military: whether the factional political or military leaders select personnel, or whether they have to appear before a board with representatives from each side plus a disinterested third party (for example, foreign military trainers).

· Retirement/pension policies—unconventional force members typically have no pension system and will likely pressure to be included in the government army's pension program.

Further elements which experience suggests should be included in a force restructuring effort include:

· A rigorous, transparent process of selection, rank conversion and promotion, which takes into account aptitude and experience as well as formal training.

· Deployment assignments for units which will be less likely to test the cohesion of the new force.

· Ethnically mixed (not segregated) units must be formed, trained, and deployed. All units should be integrated.

· New symbols and uniforms for the new force and units; rename the army; develop a new doctrine and mission statement.

· Ensure clear structures, systems, and operating procedures.

· Strict discipline, and a code of conduct banning insubordination, strikes, criminal acts, desertion, racism, partisanship, and mutiny.

· A sustained effort to promote a sense of common purpose and achievement.

· Training, instruction and operations in a common language whenever possible.

 

Cost considerations

Other resource considerations

Set-up time

Timeframe to see results

Conflict Context

Stages of conflict

Where the national army is defeated militarily in an internal conflict by its opponents or self-disintegrates, ideally, a new, integrated force would be created to needed to fill the security vacuum.

Negotiations on force integration or a controlled merger of forces are most likely to occur in the early post-conflict stage following a civil conflict, as part of the peace agreement (as currently being attempted in Angola) or during a negotiated political transition (as in South Africa). An impetus for integration can occur in the later post-conflict period (Uganda incorporated former opposition armies into the national army, then later demobilized a large number of troops) to deter future conflict and cut a bloated defense budget, or as the government's confidence increases in its ability to integrate the army successfully. A government in the early stages of conflict can initiate a move to restructure and integrate forces to allay opposition group fears

Type of conflict

Causes of conflict

Prerequisites

To merge two or more armed forces, the military and political leadership of each side must first agree to pursue integration, and have the will strong enough to actually implement a force integration program. Group leaders then need to begin the process of negotiating the terms and procedures of force restructuring. Opposition group leaders have to accept having their members integrated into the national army. Sufficient compensation and adequate conditions must be offered to induce qualified troops to continue service in the new force instead of choosing to demobilize.

The integration of two or more forces generally requires a comprehensive peace accord. Integrating new groups into an existing force is favored by negotiations and security guarantees.The two principal groups need to have at least minimal confidence in the other, and a minimal sense of physical security in serving alongside each other. The current minority or under-represented group must believe its members’ physical security will be protected in joining the armed forces.

Enlisted personnel and officers will require training, generally necessitating a combination of foreign military training teams, a military academy with sufficient capacity, and/or slots in foreign military training institutions. Several African countries offer quality military professional training courses, including Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, etc.

Generous international security assistance will likely be needed. "To maximize the effectiveness of the military assistance and to preclude the unintended gaps and redundancies in the training process, the international security assistance effort will have to be intensively coordinated. This will require one or two states (or organizations such as the UN or the OAU) to take the lead, with the other donors more or less agreeing to follow their guidance."

Past practice

Within the Greater Horn

By 1994 the civil war was virtually over. The government’s survival and integrity of the state were related to the army's ability to restore order, enforce discipline, deal equitably with hostile populations, become recognized as a national rather than an ethnic force, and allow political authority to take precedence over military authority. The regime reduced its reliance on military power by widening its support base, removing the army from a direct role in the political agenda, incorporating more groups into the political process and strengthening democratic mechanisms for political participation. The ethnic factor was eliminated from recruitment and recruitment was broadened to remove fears that the army would become an instrument of "Bantu" domination. Of the 23,000 soldiers demobilized in 1993, 38 percent were from the Northwest, Northeast, and Karamoja; 31 percent from the Southwest and West; 19 percent from Buganda; and 12 percent from the East and Southeast. All members of the various guerrilla groups were allowed to join the NRA, and others were recruited into Local Defence Units (LDUs), which were trained and controlled by the army but responsible for protecting their own villages. Some abuses by NRA soldiers continued, but much fewer than in the past, and the government made serious attempts to improve discipline.

Sudan. In the Addis Ababa agreement, the Southern Defense Force reorganized to include 6,000 troops from the Anya-Nya guerrillas and 6,000 Northern government soldiers. This formula helped reassure the south while advancing the northern objective of a single, unified army.

Rwanda, 1993-1994. The Arusha accords provided that in the new army, the senior officer appointments would be divided equally between the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR)/government and the RPF insurgents, and the enlisted troops would be recruited on a basis of 40 percent RPF and 60 percent FAR.

Over 20,000 FAR troops were to be demobilized, twice the number for that of the RPF. A further slight to the FAR was the plan for a battalion of RPF soldiers to be stationed in Kigali during the transition, a symbol of defeat for the government. This process was never fully initiated, and the agreement collapsed in 1994.

Burundi. Before Pierre Buyoya's military coup, quiet negotiations were ongoing regarding expanding and integrating the army. Moderates in Burundi see the integration of huge numbers of Hutu into the army and the gendarmerie as one of the only possibilities for peace, believing this is the only way to blunt the increasing popularity of Hutu rebel militia, especially the FDD. But Tutsi leaders fear too much compromise on this issue which threatens their historic dominance of the military.

Eritrea. The military is currently being restructured in Eritrea. The goal is to reduce troop strength from 95,000 at the end of the war to 35,000; the current force stands at 55,000. An army of 35,000 is still relatively large for a population of two million; however, the Eritrean government intends to be a major player in the region. There are 30 US military advisors and trainers based in Keren. Training for the National Service as well as anti-Sudan activity involves trainers from Israel and Egypt. The government envisions training 250,000 Eritreans for the National Service in five years.

Unresolved issues in the restructuring include the size of the army, its pay, and demobilization strategies. A dispute over pay pushed the government into creating a formal pay structure.

Outside the Greater Horn

Negotiations and preparations began under former President de Klerk. Despite military objections to the integration process, de Klerk's policy of reconciliation over confrontation reduced government reliance on physical force and the security establishment. Through reforms and firings, de Klerk eliminated or effectively silenced many officers who otherwise might have opposed his actions. He simultaneously enlarged SAP’s manpower and budget, the primary force against internal unrest. This helped assuage the military's fear of reform-induced unrest and provided a counter-balancing force to the South African Defense Force (SADF).

The diverse political and military leaders during the period of transition from authoritarian rule to democracy (1990-1994) reached consensus about the nature of the new South African army. This consensus first emerged at a 1989 conference in Zambia before the ANC was unbanned and a pluralist political system established and contributed to the integration process. Academics, senior ANC leaders, Homeland army officers and an unofficial SADF delegation broadly agreed that the new defense force should be a constitutional army working within the rule of law, nonpartisan and nonracial; that its primary role should be to protect the territorial integrity of South Africa, and that it should be subordinate to civilian control and fully accountable to parliament. The joint proposals that emerged from this conference included the following priorities: there should be a mutually binding ceasefire prior to the commencement of negotiations; that future defense force should be nonracial, open to all citizens, and be a professional-type organization with high standards of efficiency; that the system of conscription for whites should be phased out and that there should be a "gradual but substantial reduction in force levels." Rationales were that:

· A representative integrated force would increase the new government's legitimacy and credibility.

· Many former MK were proud of their role in the struggle and wanted to serve in the new military. Many wanted to keep their jobs due to high unemployment. Many former MK soldiers were politically motivated and eager to be part of the new defense force to "consolidate the gains of our struggle." · Many in the government saw that a central task in post-apartheid South Africa was to create a common society, to build institutions that unify rather than divide, in a society previously dominated by a racial group, socially fragmented, scarred by deep inequalities, and riven by competing and apparently irreconcilable ideologies. Constructing a unified defense force was part of this task.

· The coexistence of various armed forces is potentially dangerous and could lead to civil war.

· No single armed force had the trust of the entire population. "By virtue of their historical roles and characters, neither the SADF nor MK on its own would be regarded as a genuinely national post-apartheid defence force."

· An integrated force would help allay the security fears of whites and other opposition groups. No single armed force was representative of the entire population. The SADF was white, Afrikaner-dominated, and the MK and Homeland forces were black and widely believed to be dominated by Xhosas. A representative defense force could contribute to social cohesion and nation building.

The largest force was the former government military (SADF, with 85,000 full-time). The military arm of the African National Congress (ANC), Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation, or MK), had an estimated 30,000 trained guerrillas, of whom 21,000 eventually signed up to join the new military. The Azanian Peoples Liberation Army (APLA), the armed wing of the Pan African Congress, had about 6,000. The apartheid era black "homelands" (Bophuthathswana, Ciskei, Transkei, and Venda) also had their own, highly politicized, military forces, totaling about 10,000 members.

The new force was to be composed of up to 17,000 MK members; 6,000 members of APLA; 10,000 from the "Homeland armies"; and 85,000 of the existing full-time members of the SADF. The Homeland armies and SADF together were termed the "statutory forces." Challenges included:

· Integrating differently trained members speaking different languages who had formerly worked to kill each other.

· Different military cultures: the integration process involved a clash between the MK's notion of a "people's army" with themselves as "revolutionary soldiers" and SADF's conception of a professional army. Although a comparatively small and ill-equipped guerrilla-type army, the MK was ideologically powerful.

· Hugely varying competence and training—some MK guerrillas were given formal training while others were more versed in sabotage than formal training. MK and APLA had received training in several countries including Egypt, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, India, and Libya.

· Reorganization and reorientation of forces in a different regional context, obsolescence of some military equipment, and pressures to keep military spending down to free up resources for national reconstruction and development.

· MK soldiers, who had no pensions, were "frantic" for retirement on equal terms.

· Issues of professionalism—during negotiations prior to the political transition, the Minister of Defense and SADF had repeatedly dismissed the possibility of integrating government and guerrilla armies on the grounds that MK lacked the requisite professional standards. "...Professional officers who had trained for years were irked at the idea that these rag-tag guerrillas, who had barely seen any real combat, would be recruited at an equivalent rank." The SADF opposed the notion of affirmative action in the new defense force on the grounds that it would undermine professional standards and worried they may have fewer opportunities in a smaller, more "mixed" force.

· There had been no formal ceasefire demarcating the cessation of hostilities, and for many there was no clear victor. At the same time, many MK felt that the ANC had won and expected to be awarded the spoils of victory.

· Integration of forces was seen by many as absorption of Homeland and guerrilla armies into the SADF.

· Many former MK soldiers felt disoriented, having recently returned to South Africa after years in exile and lacking access to accommodations, stable kinship and social networks. Many had disrupted educations, were living in poverty, and suffered from serious emotional, physical, or social problems.

The actual integration process began in April 1994 following months of negotiation within the Joint Military Coordinating Committee (JMCC), when MK, APLA, and Homeland army soldiers began reporting to three different assembly points throughout the country.

The new structure was expected to involve force levels of 120,000 to 130,000 once integration was complete, scheduled for the end of 1995 but later extended. Downsizing was not the first priority. The new military actually grew in order to integrate the over 100,000 differently trained and organized units from the former SADF, MK, APLA and "homeland" armies.

A British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT), experienced in facilitating military integration in Zimbabwe and Namibia, assisted with training and acted as a referee in disputes involving the various parties.

Integrating the military forces has been difficult and proceeded much more slowly than anticipated, experiencing problems since inception. In June 1994 over 2,000 people were expelled from an assembly point because they did not appear on the MK's master list of names submitted during preparation for integration. SADF sources charged in May that the ANC was "using the military as an employment agency for township rabble." Problems of salaries, ranks and conditions plagued the process of integrating the first 7,000 MK soldiers of a planned 30,000.

The SADF and MK had agreed that members of the "nonstatutory forces" (MK and APLA) would go before an SANDF placement board, assisted by BMATT officials, for assessment and confirmation of their rank so they could be placed within the new military structure. Many MK believed that white former SADF officers had undue influence despite MK and BMATT representation on the placement board. Shortly after the election, seven former MK members were appointed generals and two as brigadiers. Some former MK commanders received high rank without the necessary formal qualifications, despite white officers’ considerable opposition. However, MK leaders also complained that many were ranked but not placed, meaning they were not paid according to their ranks.

In late 1994, 7,000 former MK soldiers who had been on leave refused to return to base, protesting the pace and style of military integration. Their grievances included:

· Claims that the creation of the SANDF actually involved a process of absorption into the SADF rather than the amalgamation of forces into an entirely new structure.

· A belief that the integration process was going too slowly.

· Complaints of being misled by the ANC over the terms of integration, with faith lost in the SANDF chief of staff’s and Minister of Defense’s leadership, believing they had betrayed them by failing to defend their interests.

· Pay too low; pay generally lower than their white counterparts’.

· Pensions promised and not delivered.

· An unfair ranking process; low ranks allotted regardless of training.

· White officers frustrating the process of integration; patronizing treatment from immediate superiors who were former foes; racist white officers.

· Instructors often reverted to Afrikaans, while training is supposed to be in the language that most of the group understands, usually English.

· Intolerable living conditions, poor food, insufficient blankets and tents in winter.

· A lack of regard for officer status acquired in East Bloc training.

· Soldiers waiting to appear before the placement board were only paid a small monthly allowance, while people of the same rank in the SADF and homeland armies were getting full pay and perks.

· MK soldiers were not issued uniforms until after their mass protest and had to wear civilian clothes at the camp. "This was interpreted as another sign of the SADF's undermining of their status and training as soldiers. 'White SADF can be seen strutting about confidently in clean uniforms and insignia which psychologically demeans the MK officer in civilian clothes whose rank has hardly been confirmed.'"

· The assembly points were apparently under the exclusive control of former SADF officers.

· The requirement of a minimum K12 standard of education to qualify as an officer was an unfair handicap for MK soldiers, many of whom had disrupted their educations when they joined the MK, had been denied an education by apartheid, and felt they should be ranked by merit rather than by a certificate.

· Lack of a new military doctrine, with the result that the SADF still existed as before, only "cleansed by a name change."

The 7,000 MK soldiers left the military bases and mounted various protests including marches, petitions, and occupying an ANC office. 5,000 returned upon President Mandela's personal appearance to address their grievances. The President and Minister of Defense acknowledged the legitimacy of many of the grievances; while agreeing that the bureaucracy was moving too slowly, the Deputy Minister of Defense blamed the lack of discipline of MK soldiers. More than half of the protesters returned to their bases after two weeks, and President Mandela gave the rest seven days to return or face dismissal. The situation resolved but occurred again two weeks later. After weeks of protests some soldiers returned, over two thousand were discharged and others faced court martial.

"White officers grumble that unmarried ex-guerrillas claim medical care for their common-law wives [and that] black officers are not yet qualified for the job, that trainees take weekend leave that stretches to weeks and more, and 500 from only one base had simply vanished. Over 1,000 would-be soldiers spent months waiting to hear whether they would have a future in the army, whether they had passed their tests and met the requirements. Ex-guerrillas were trained apart from the units they would later join, leaving the genuine forging of a common identity until when the soldiers would begin to live, eat and exercise together.

Many former MK soldiers felt the delays in the integration process were part of a deliberate SADF strategy of demoralization and sabotage, intended to lead to frustration, which would start breaking discipline and further undermine and discredit the MK, and even to turn former MK members against the new government. The homeland armies, 1,000 PAC troops, and Azanian People's Organization cadres also experienced difficulties in integrating.

As of August 1995, a third of the ex-guerrillas were in mid-training, and 1,400 (3 percent) had finished, of which 11 became generals; 20 percent of the officers were black. The rest were being assembled, or waiting at bases where officers assessed their experience, ranked them, provide them with kits and dispatched them for training that could last up to two years. The original aim was to get all the soldiers into training by the end of 1993, but the target was later changed to late 1996. "One reason for the delay was a decision to lower the size of each intake, so that the groups being trained would be smaller and more manageable. That has smoothed some earlier difficulties." A relatively small dissident radical element is believed likely to remain inassimilable.

Most difficult of all is overcoming distrust and mutual suspicion. To erode this and make colleagues out of adversaries, the SANDF devised a "psychological integration program"—bonding for soldiers. Under this scheme, mixed batches of 20 or so soldiers are sent off for four days, leaving their uniforms, ranks, surnames, and hopefully their inhibitions behind. The course involves games, group discussions and drawing. Hundreds of soldiers have taken part. Some officers complain about the sessions, argue it is more important for the less senior ranks, that the tough pre-election negotiations in 1993-94 between army chiefs were enough to rid officers of most of their antagonism 'without the shrinks sitting about watching us.' It is too early to tell whether the bonding would last.

Even once integration is complete, downsizing the military and reducing military spending will be difficult. Integrating and reorganizing the military is expensive; the larger force is more expensive; and all elements of the military are being reconfigured as South Africa moves from an offensive to a more defensive posture and the army creates a new "Service Brigade" intended for nation-building activities as all services learn how to participate in humanitarian relief and peacekeeping missions.

SADF aims to trim down to 91,000 or even to 75,000, a loss of up to 60,000 over three years. If the government wants the army's racial composition to match the population, the majority of those removed will be white soldiers. This downsizing will further test reconciliation.

Namibia, 1988-1991. Various forces were demobilized, redeployed and disarmed prior to independence in 1990, when the South African Defense Force returned home and the UN Transitory Assistance Group (UNTAG) successfully demobilized and disarmed the South African-backed South West African Territorial Force (SWATF) and paramilitary units. The South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) guerrilla units were assembled under UNTAG supervision in camps in Angola, either to be disarmed and returned to Namibia or integrated into the new Namibian army. The SWAPO-led regime successfully built a new armed force with a targeted 10,000 troops, assisted by a British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT). Former SWAPO guerrilla fighters made up the main body of the force, while some positions were allotted to SWATF personnel and to new recruits.

Zimbabwe, 1981-1983. Following independence, between July 1981-June 1983, three armies, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the Zimbabwe People's revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), and the Rhodesian government armed forces undertook a state-directed process of reintegration and force restructuring. Although initial plans were set for a new 25,000-person armed force (_ ex-guerrilla and _ former Rhodesian regulars), the continuing unsettled security situation in the region contributed to a force build-up. "The Zimbabwe National Army in particular seems to have embraced both the traditions of a 'regular' professional corps and a guerrilla army with political objectives."

Evaluation

Strengths

Weaknesses

The process of force restructuring is dependent on the ability to work out a political agreement, the strength of that agreement, and the political will on both sides to implement it successfully.

The need for integration must be identified by senior miliary and political leadership. The heretofore dominant ethnic/political group in the military may feel its position threatened and resent and resist any move toward actual power-sharing, possibly even to the extent of attempting a coup.

The integration process requires commitment by the international community as well as the leaders and troops from each side to implement the goals set out in the accord.

Large-scale force integration is an expensive process.

All levels of the existing military likely will have a limited absorptive capacity to incorporate the additional troops needed to represent the various groups at levels more closely approximating their representation in the society. Integration efforts therefore will likely need to be accompanied by demobilization of a large percentage of the dominant group in the national army.

A restructuring process is complex logistically and likely to be contentious. There are bound to be delays, especially if one or more of the groups resist certain aspects of the integration process. Each side will be insecure and likely to be intolerant of any perceived slights by the other.

It is difficult to forge a single, united, disciplined force out of disparate armed formations, with greatly differing traditions, training, and agendas, especially when they have recently been enemies. To combine and standardize an army made up of diverse sources requires extensive training and the manpower and resources available to do so.

Force integration should accompany but cannot take the place of national reconciliation and a restructuring of the political process.

Lessons learned

Training time and facilities, finances, and accommodations available may play a larger role than the security situation in determining force strength and the pace of integration.

If troops are to be cantoned in assembly points prior to integration, assembly points for irregular forces should not be under government army control singly, but under a coalition or international forces.

Troops may spend several months waiting to hear whether they will have a future in the army, whether they have passed their tests and met requirements. Steps should be taken to minimize this time and to ensure favorable living conditions and productive activities during the waiting period.

The experience in some countries suggests phasing the integration process over an extended period of time to develop a better sense of cohesion. South Africa decided to slow down its integration process to train smaller groups over a longer period of time. However, others warn of the dangers of delays, including accusations and resentment over deliberate, politically motivated foot-dragging which can provoke mutinies, desertion, and coup attempts. Factors in addition to the progress made in political restructuring which seem to allow a more leisurely pace to carry out force integration include how those troops awaiting selection, training, and assignment are treated, where they are sent while waiting and under what conditions, and whether they are paid. Non-government forces are sensitive to mistreatment or perceived slights such as poor living conditions, not being in uniform while in waiting, not being paid or being paid less than similarly ranked government counterparts, and unfair ranking criteria.

Ex-guerrillas should be trained with, not apart from, the units they will later join, to better forge a common identity.

References and resources

C. Enloe. Ethnic Soldiers. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980.

Anthony D. Marley, Integration of the Armed Forces and Demobilization of Excess Combatants in Burundi: A Conceptual Analysis, prepared for the US Dept. of State and US Institute of Peace, Conference on Burundi, Meridian International Center, Washington, DC, September 10, 1996.