click here to return to the toolbox list|
Tool Category C: Military Measures
6. Professionalization of the Military

Description

   Professionalization of national armed forces describes a set of processes to redefine the military’s role and restructure forces so as to yield a less politicized institution that can better serve as a de facto state structure.
     

Objectives

   Professionalization of the military typically aims to improve the military’s capacity to carry out its mission and increase members’ discipline and accountability for their actions.

Military professionalization can be initiated by civilian governments or by the military itself. Military leaders introducing professionalization steps generally aim to make the military institution stronger, to operate more consistently and effectively, to become more efficient with resources, to improve the use of modern technology and weapons, and to become a more unified entity less riven by factionalism.

Civilian governments often wish to professionalize the national armed forces to consolidate civilian control of military actions and resources, to minimize government vulnerability to military overthrow, to decrease the size of the armed forces, to reduce military abuses of power which can provoke domestic or external violent conflict, to increase military support for democracy, and to generate greater respect for human and civil rights.
     

Expected outcome or impact

   Professionalizing the miliary should reduce the incidence of military coup attempts and of misappropriation of resources for use in internal disputes. It should also increase the military’s power and organization while reducing its resistance to downsizing. Successful reforms and a more professional military are likely to remove a common source of internal conflict as well as a factor which may have aggravated conflicts driven by other causes. Military professionalism efforts can therefore help prevent internal conflicts in the long term, especially if accompanied by political restructuring. Professionalizing a country’s military may also bolster its forces’ deterrent value and thereby dissuade military actions by countries who otherwise might be inclined to attack.
     

Relationship to conflict prevention and mitigation

   A more professional army is better trained and disciplined, less politicized and parochial and therefore less likely to take sides in an internal conflict or to engage in rights abuses which provoke internal opposition. A military disengaged from politics is less apt to be involved in internal repression, to provoke external conflicts or to resort to adventurism in foreign policy to increase domestic legitimacy. A more professional military should demand a smaller share of the budget, freeing up competition for resources that can aggravate internal conflict. At the same time, a stronger and more loyal military can assist post-conflict transition by supporting reforms or by controlling violently unleashed popular demands or the old order’s resistance.
     

Implementation

Organizers

   Whether efforts at reform and professionalization of national armed forces are initiated by the military or by a civilian government, national-level government and military leadership’s approval are required, with possible assistance from external actors in planning, design, implementation, funding and training.
     

Participants

   Military professionalization involves civilian government leaders and administrative entities related to defense and security, the national-level military, and other national security forces.
     

Activities

   Military professionalization involves defining or redefining the military’s role and mission, revising the force structure to be consistent with the redefined role and mission, adopting professional standards for military members, providing professional training and education to improve the force’s capability to carry out its mission, and increasing military members’ discipline and accountability for their actions.

Steps in military professionalization. Some steps are taken by the military, others by government, still others by external actors. These measures can be undertaken singly or in combination and typically include the following steps.

· Begin with a thorough assessment of the military’s interests, threats, missions and capabilities and of actual threats, ultimately in order to match military capabilities to security requirements.

· Define (or redefine) the military’s role and mission, with a formal statement of legal and constitutional restraints on the military and its responsibilities to the state.

· Develop an official military doctrine—a detailed statement of the role, mission, strategy, goals and responsibilities of the armed forces.

¨ Disaggregate military responsibilities from those of other national security forces (police, paramilitary, intelligence).

¨ Focus on defending sovereignty against external security threats.

¨ Reduce or eliminate the military’s role in domestic law enforcement and internal security. · Revise the military’s organization and structure to be consistent with the new role and mission.

¨ Adopt professional standards and criteria to improve the force’s capability to carry out the revised mission.

¨ Specify standards and state formal qualifications for military membership in terms of education, training, experience, age and health.

¨ Develop formal rank and promotion structure and procedures that are more transparent and more removed from patronage.

¨ Clearly define and structure command and control procedures.

¨ Increase rank and file and officer accountability for their actions by improving the effectiveness of the military justice system and by mandating military accountability to civilian justice system for crimes against civilians.

¨ Reorganize the armed forces’ service composition, force posture, basing, deployment and geographic concentration.

· Maximize military professionalism.

¨ Reform or create a formal professional military education and training system to reflect the new doctrine, with military academies and training schools.

¨ Train troops in the new doctrine.

¨ Reward improved training and standards with increased salaries and benefits.

· Strengthen civilian control over the military.

¨ Train civilian authorities in the new doctrine and military education systems.

¨ Restructure the relationship between the executive, legislative and security branches of government to ensure a clear constitutional and practical definition of the executive chain of authority over the different security forces (military, police, paramilitary, intelligence).

¨ Set up systems so that the legislature balances executive prerogatives in military affairs by controlling defense spending, confirming appointments of civilian officials responsible for security affairs, and setting legal parameters of national security policy.

¨ Clearly divide authority in the constitution and/or amendments between the president or prime minister and the defense ministry.

¨ Enact clear laws governing peacetime authority—command and control of the military, promotions of senior military officers, and appointment of civilian defense officials—and crisis, including emergency powers and the transition to war.

¨ Ensure that the civilian defense ministry controls the military general staff and commanders through effective peacetime oversight of the defense budget, intelligence, strategic planning, force structure and deployments, arms acquisitions, and military promotions.

¨ Increase civilian control of the military budget and in managing military resources so that the military is able to protect the state from external threats without giving domestic military elements a security justification for engagement in government affairs.

¨ Enact constitutional sanctions to discourage and punish military insubordination.

¨ Educate civilian leaders on security issues.

¨ Create civilian experts on defense and strategic studies.

· Reduce military corruption and involvement in business.

¨ Outlaw all forms of material and professional payoffs to military members—pay, promotions, barracks, equipment, offering privileged access to opportunities such as land and government contracts, or coopting officers through appointment to government positions.

¨ Bar political commissariats and party branches from the armed forces.

· Depoliticize the military and increase military support for democracy.

¨ Make an official statement of and require respect for formal legal and constitutional restraints and responsibilities.

¨ Enact steps or provide training to increase miliary members’ respect for human and civil rights.

¨ Withdraw military officers from government office.

¨ Depoliticize troops by emphasizing loyalty to the state as a political institution as opposed to personal loyalty or allegiance to a clan, ethnic group, religion, political party or region.

The sequence of steps to restructure the armed forces may be critical to successfully preventing coups d’état during a massive military reform and restructuring process; one observer recommends that first steps be to explicitly establish the chain of command, missions, and balance of power among the security forces; provide a counterweight force through the internal police force and/or neutral, external military forces; and take steps to create an organizational environment that enhances civilian control.

External assistance to reform efforts. The presence of external neutral forces in a transition period can help contain violence in the short term while new security arrangements are being developed, including reforming and restructuring the military and/or creating new security forces.

Regional and sub-regional cooperative and collective security arrangements may assist a legitimate civilian government in professionalizing its military forces. Involving national forces in regional cooperative and collective security arrangements such as peacekeeping operations can give the armed forces a legitimate external defense mission: "training for collective security can help to keep the military professionally occupied and out of internal security and politics." Regional alliance partners can help support civilian control by intervening to block coups. "Regional cooperative security measures can also encourage military downsizing and defensive force postures to increase military transparency and regional stability."

External parties can encourage professionalization of a country’s military through some of the following actions.

· Support military-to-military contacts to promote a better understanding of the role, rights and responsibilities of the military in a democratic society.

· Integrate the military’s support of democracy into ongoing contacts between host and foreign defense establishments.

· Continue and expand contacts between Department of Defense personnel and civilian and military leaders of transitioning or emerging democracies, through Military Liaison Teams, small unit exchanges and exercises.

· Create and support regional programs which promote democracy, respect for human rights, military justice administration, and civilian control of the military. Donor countries can include programs for educating and professionalizing the military in their assistance strategies.

· Support programs to train new troops in the new doctrine, reform military education systems, or train civilian leaders in security matters.

· Assist the national government in evaluating officers to ensure they meet both performance and human rights criteria.

· Convene regional conferences on the role of the military in a democratic society and civil-military relations, encouraging civilian and military leadership’s participation.

· Encourage input, coordination and approval of military professionalization programs through civilian channels of authority in the host country. Include host country personnel (military and civilian) in the design of any such programs.

· Encourage reforms to increase accountability and transparency by developing ethical and apolitical standards; enhance civilian expertise and oversight of defense policy and its execution.

· Help devise/revise an officer education program. Provide reading materials on democracy and democratic political systems and the inter-relationship of the military. Provide support to regional academic centers that can teach civilian defense establishments and militaries the concepts and practice of the role of the military.

· Strengthen civilian expertise in defense affairs to improve responsible civilian control of the military.

· Initiate programs in other countries aimed at improving respect for human rights and military justice systems. Institutionalize human rights training in foreign security forces. Condition military aid to human rights performance of the military.

· Send teams of military justice experts to improve host nation capabilities by reforming codes of conduct and strengthening expertise in internal investigations.

· Ensure that the military is a key component both of democratic reform and of preventing and mitigating violent internal conflict.

· Ensure any foreign military assistance is balanced with programs to support civilian institutions and improve the management capabilities and skills of the civilian administration overseeing the military.

· Monitor the government’s progress in security reform. Condition further assistance to progress in reforms.

· Develop criteria to monitor security reform. Condition further military and development assistance to continued demonstration of commitment by the government in security reforms. "The ability of the international community to reform these forces without strong commitment on the part of domestic actors is limited." Questions to answer to evaluate whether the government has sufficient political will to reform and restructure the military include the following:

¨ Has the government named reform-minded officials to key posts? Do these officials have sufficient power and commitment to confront those who oppose reforms?

¨ Is the new force engaged in abuses? How willing and able are the leaders to discipline and prosecute those who engage in abuse?

¨ How transparent are defense and security budgets? Do the civilian population and legislative bodies have the authority to evaluate the budgets?

The international community can help establish domestic institutions at governmental, quasi-governmental, and nongovernmental levels that have the capacity and interest to pursue and push the security reform agenda.
     

Cost considerations

   The costs of a reform effort vary widely depending on the scope of reform undertaken. Training programs and foreign visits may be relatively inexpensive.
     

Other resource considerations

   Foreign military forces may be very helpful as trainers and in joint operations. Training materials and facilities are likely necessary. New weaponry and equipment may be needed.
     

Set-up time

   The time needed to devise and implement military reforms varies..
     

Timeframe to see results

   Individual reform programs may proceed quickly but with limited effects; over time, several separate programs can produce a cumulative effect. In a post-conflict situation, effectiveness of reforms may require more time than the accords provide; the international community may need to make a longer commitment to ensure that these reforms are effective.
     

Conflict context

Stages of conflict

   Military professionalization is an appropriate step during numerous stages of conflict. Civilian governments often initiate a military professionalization process during the early stages of a rising internal conflict in order to lessen military abuses and increase civilian control in the hopes of reducing popular opposition to the regime. Professionalization efforts are appropriate in the early post-conflict stage following a civil conflict during a war-to-peace transition, or during a negotiated political transition, a change of government under new regime rules, or the initiation of constitutional negotiations. Professionalization efforts can be undertaken during the midst of a conflict to increase forces’ effectiveness. Steps to professionalize the military can be undertaken by a government in the later post-conflict period, as the need to do so becomes more apparent and the government feels greater confidence in its ability to successfully implement military reforms.

At the same time, one analyst warns that post-transition, a new regime runs a greater risk of a coup attempt by non-reformed and likely disloyal security forces, especially if they fear it may hold them responsible for past human rights abuses. This same source acknowledges that "appeasement will not eradicate the potential for usurpation nor will strict enforcement necessarily ensure military obedience to civilian authority" and that "civilian control ultimately rests on the normative acceptance of the legitimacy of civilian rule by the military."
     

Type of conflict

   Military professionalization is appropriate both for internal conflicts where military abuses of civilian populations and lack of civilian control over the military play important roles, and for external conflicts provoked by lack of civilian control and poor military discipline.<<
     

Prerequisites

   The regime must have political legitimacy. "Armies occupy disproportionate political places in African states where the elementary processes of state- and nation-building are incomplete and contested."

Military reform efforts must be accompanied or even preceded by changes in political structures to make them more inclusive and magnify their effect.

In order to agree to professionalization reforms, the military might require that the civil government provide reassurances that it will not intervene in the armed forces’ internal affairs, guarantees that the army’s internal operation will not be manipulated by civilians, assurances that the military will retain power in areas of national security (although these may be redefined), and assurances that force members will not suffer reprisals for past actions connected with "domestic security." In a post-conflict transition from a civil conflict, the military may request amnesty to be decreed for offenses conducted by armed force members against citizens.
     

Past practice

Within the Greater Horn

   The national government must have the political will to pursue genuine security reform; external supporters could accompany their assistance efforts with procedures to monitor the government’s political will, and make clear to the government that continued assistance is conditioned on demonstrations of political will in the area of security sector reform.

Uganda, 1986-1996. For 25 years predatory military rule and civil war destroyed lives, skills and assets, undermined institutional competence and accountability, suppressed autonomous organizations in civil society, and intensified ethnic hostility and conflict. Problems included regional, ethnic and sectarian conflicts in political and military organizations; poorly educated and corrupt miliary leaders; an army which made unsustainable demands on state and economic resources; political elites unwilling to accept electoral defeat; weak non-military components of the state apparatus; and weak organizational capacity of groups and associations in civil society. Political loyalties rather than military skills had been critical, destroying solidarity, technical competence and the ability to enforce military discipline, turning the army into an oppressive social force and producing increasing repression levels. Ethnicity was the key factor in recruitment and promotions, and many educated officers from the "wrong" ethnic groups were dismissed or otherwise punished. The officer corps was decimated and untrained soldiers were promoted. Military expenditure skyrocketed. Violent crime escalated, often perpetrated by military personnel. Regimes’ political dependence on the military make it implausible to discipline them; soldiers were frequently drunk, unpaid, and out of control. Ethnic conflicts escalated.

The National Resistance Movement (NRM) came to power in 1986. The NRM and its military wing, the National Resistance Army (NRA), increasingly established national security and began moving the country toward a more peaceful path of social and economic reconstruction and development. Rebellion and banditry continued in various parts of the country until 1991. The NRA had greatly increased in size through assimilation of defeated rebel forces. Uganda undertook a program to professionalize the regular army, including establishing a command structure, personnel and logistics systems, training, and acquisition of equipment and supplies. As the Museveni regime consolidated power and political situation was stabilized, attempts were made to reduce the size of the army. The ethnic factor was eliminated from recruitment, and recruitment was broadened. All members of the various guerrilla groups were allowed to join the NRA, and others were recruited into Local Defence Units (LDUs) which were trained and controlled by the army but responsible for protecting their own villages. The creation of LDUs generated a citizen force in some disturbed areas, and the state is attempting to give as many civilians as possible some military training. Some abuses by NRA soldiers continued, but much fewer than in the past, and the government made serious attempts to improve discipline. A "Code of Conduct for the National Army" was added in 1987. By 1994 the civil war was virtually over. The survival of the government and integrity of the state was related to the army’s ability to restore order, enforce discipline, deal equitably with hostile populations, become recognized as a national rather than an ethnic force, and allow political authority to take precedence over military authority as the army was removed as a direct player in setting the political agenda. The regime reduced its reliance on military power by widening its support base, incorporating more groups into the political process and strengthening the democratic mechanisms through which they are selected.

There is still no certainty the NRA would serve other leaders with the same loyalty as they currently serve Museveni. In 1993, the Constitutional Commission emphasized the need for a professional army which would serve national, not partisan interests; vested overall command in the President, advised by an Armed Forces Council; and called for a National Security Council to coordinate all security organizations and an Armed Forces Service Board to advise on conditions and terms of service and promotions.
     

Outside the Greater Horn

   Central and Eastern Europe. The US Military-to-Military/Joint Contact Team Program operates in Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and the Baltic. The program provides military liaison teams of US personnel to assist in the transition to democracy, encouraging their armed forces to develop into "positive, constructive elements of democratic societies that are apolitical, respect human rights, and adhere to the rule of law."

Teams have been established in Hungary, Albania, the Baltic, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Liaison teams work in the host country for a year, helping Ministry of Defense personnel to identify needed assistance. A sustainment liaison team then takes over, first providing information to Ministry of Defense personnel on democracy, civilian control of the military, and budget development, followed by an exchange between host country and US personnel. In FY 93, the program was allocated $6 million, and FY 94 costs were estimated at over $24 million.

In 1993, with support from the US Congress and the Government of Germany, the US Secretary of Defense established the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Bavaria. In addition to promoting defense cooperation and partnership with the emerging democracies of Eastern and Central Europe, the defense training programs are for both military and civilian defense officials and include extensive curricula in "democratic defense management" such as the role of executive and legislative oversight, the professional role of the military in democracies, and reconciling intelligence systems with the need for openness in a democratic society.

IMET. In 1991, the US Congress expanded the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program to include civilian leaders, and in 1993 authorized training to members of national legislatures responsible for oversight and management of the military. This training of civilians is expected to contribute to responsible defense resource management; foster greater respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military; and improve military justice systems and procedures in accordance with internationally recognized human rights.

El Salvador, mid-1980s; Honduras, late 1970s. There is some evidence to suggest that US training helped convince the officer corps to accept a broader range of political opinions and restrain its power in certain limited areas. However, there is no evidence that it led them to transfer their loyalties from the military institution to the civilian government, to recognize the right of civilians to control the military, or to give up limiting and shaping the ways in which civilians are allowed to exercise power. During this time period, whenever the military perceived a threat to its institutional autonomy, it rejected US pressures and continued to dominate the political process.
     

Evaluation

Strengths

   Military professionalization is a necessary step in long-term transformation of military-dominated societies to democratic civilian rule. Increased skills and professional standards of officers, non-commissioned officers and ranks from a professionalization effort may allow for a reduction of the services, increasing the quality and effectiveness of personnel while reducing the overall size of the force. Over time, successfully professionalized militaries reduce misappropriation of military resources in internal, especially personal, disputes.
     

Weaknesses

   Increased military effectiveness can undermine civilian control over the military and escalate military intervention in government affairs when it is not accompanied by political liberalization and greater consolidation of power by the civilian government. Some analysts believe that professionalization and reform efforts strengthen or modify attitudes but are not likely to produce sudden or radical alterations or behavior.

The mechanisms to professionalize the army and maintain civilian control over it are not foolproof, and strict enforcement does not necessarily ensure military obedience to civilian authority. Civilian control of the military ultimately rests on the military accepting the legitimacy of civilian rule; reluctance to exercise civilian control for fear of aggravating military antagonism can act over time to erode civilian authority.

A professionalization and reform effort takes a long time to accomplish.

Some objectives of foreign-led military reform efforts may be at cross-purposes with other objectives of foreign policy or implemented without full consideration of their possible consequences.Those who are in the best position to evaluate these reforms are often themselves military members who may be unwilling to share information which could be used to reduce military capabilities.

Support for professionalizing the military when a country is currently or potentially in external conflict might be interpreted as a hostile act against opponents.

The impact of professionalization efforts on troops’ behavior and civil-military relations may be minimal and unpredictable.

Courses aimed at teaching the military respect for human rights and democracy have had mixed success. Participant selection, military advancement, and rotational policies within the host countries sometimes mean trained people are ineffectively placed or used. There is some evidence that intensive training of junior officers may alter institutional attitudes over time.
     

Lessons learned

   Proponents insist a professional military is less likely to spark conflicts within the country or to misappropriate military resources for personal interests. However, if military membership is dominated by one ethnic, political or regional group, professionalization efforts can strengthen that group’s control and position. To avoid this, professionalization assistance should be accompanied by steps to restructure and integrate the armed forces (covered in another profile in this section).

Foreign assistance, especially training, must be accompanied by steps to strengthen civil structures such as efforts to create or strengthen civilian police and other security forces to carry out internal security/police-type tasks. Creating a stronger police force is also useful to counterbalance military power and can discourage coup attempts.

Local political civilian and military will cannot be dictated or imposed; external actors supporting change in how militaries are structured and run should engage in a dialogue which points out the benefits of professionalization and its potential for resolving various problems.
     

References and resources

   Frazer, Jendayi E., "Conceptualizing Civil-Military Relations During Democratic Transition." Africa Today (1st and 2nd Quarters, 1995): 39-48.

Huntington, Samuel, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956).

David Goldsworthy, "Civilian Control of the Military in Black Africa," African Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 318 (January 1981): 49-74.Nolan, James E., "The Concept of Cooperative Security," in Nolan (ed.) Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994): 3-18.

S. Baynham (ed.), Military Power and Politics in Black Africa. London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986.

H.S. Bienen, Armed Forces, Conflict and Change in Africa, Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1989.

Harbeson, J.B. (ed.), The Military in African Politics. New York: Praeger, 1987.

Huntington, S., The Soldier and The State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. New York: Vintage Books, 1957.

Gilbert M. Khadiagala, "The Military in Africa’s Democratic Transitions: Regional Dimensions," Africa Today, 1st and 2nd Quarters, 1995: 61-74

William J. Foltz, "Democracy: Officers and Politicians," Africa Report, Vol. 38, No. 3 (1993), pp. 65-67.

"Security Reform in Post-Conflict Countries", in Making Peace Work: Lessons for the International Development Community, ODC, Conference Report, Washington, DC, May 9, 1996.