Toolbox: 5. Military Measures

Tool Category C: Military Measures
5. Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBM)

Description		Traditionally seen as agreements between two or more governments regarding exchanges of information, joint activities and achievement of mutual goals regarding the size, composition, disposition, movements and use of their respective military forces and armaments, CSBMs can also be applied to intra-state conflict prevention between a government and non-government parties or between two or more non-government parties.

*Objectives*		CSBMs aim to lessen tensions by increasing transparency of capabilities and intentions, allaying anxieties or suspicions and improving predictability for the parties involved, clarifying intentions about military force and political activities. CSBMs are meant to give each participant confidence that the other(s) is not preparing military action, providing a way to avoid misunderstandings about ambiguous events, policies, or perceived threats that otherwise might result in violent confrontations. A series of CSBMs creates an ongoing set of political exchange relationships and reciprocities that result in "political learning" among the rival parties.

*Expected outcome* *or impact*		By creating points of contact and interaction between parties that require communication of credible information, CSBMs should lead to greater transparency and reduced risks of war caused by miscalculation, misunderstanding of intentions, and miscommunication. In the short run, CSBMs aim to alter inaccurate—usually negative— perceptions of motives toward each other, and thus avoid misjudgments concerning military actions and policies that might otherwise provoke violent conflict. Over time, CSBMs can erode barriers in the way of closer, more stable, political and diplomatic relations, change a country's concept of its military security needs and interests, and even encourage moves to identify shared security or other interests.

*Relationship to conflict prevention and mitigation*		Mutual confidence is essential to reducing the likelihood of conflict between states. While a single CSBM is not likely to prevent a conflict, a series of such agreements can provide reassurance to the parties. Confidence-building measures can support new institutional arrangements which may create a better foundation for peaceful relations.

Implementation *Organizers*		CSBMs can be initiated by individual governments or non-state actors, or through third parties such as the UN, regional organizations, or other states.

*Participants*		Participants in the CSBM process are the governments of the two or more states or the state and non-state actors involved in the particular agreement.

*Activities*		CSBM activities are military, diplomatic, and communications measures that can be undertaken between or within states. Some of the CSBMs summarized below are detailed in full in other tool profiles in this section. Military and Diplomatic CSBMs · Systematic exchange of military missions. · Demobilization, disarmament, and force restructuring. · Formation of regional or sub-regional risk reduction centers. · Arrangements for the free flow of information, including monitoring regional arms agreements. · Information exchange, communications, and notification requirements such as pre-notification of upcoming military activities like war games and training exercises or troop movements carried out close to borders. · Declarations and codes of conduct such as common targets for the levels of armaments, or within a state, codes of conduct for domestic behavior of security forces. · Consultative mechanisms, security commissions, and other joint activities, such as direct telephone lines between military commanders, mutual privileges for joint observation of military maneuvers or inspection of military installations, and meetings to review cross-border problems such as smuggling, poaching, customs, and cattle rustling. · Exchange of relevant information accompanied by intrusive verification procedures, including observation and on-site inspection. · States in the region could agree on the norms of behavior in the military field similar to that in Europe laid out in the OSCE Code of Conduct (Budapest, 1994), which addressed principles of the use of force in peacetime and in internal conflicts. Cultural CSBMs Cultural CSBMs are actions by a government which demonstrate sensitivity to traditional authorities and local cultures. Some cultural CSBMs include: · Refraining from repressive laws on language, religious practice and law, and other unwanted measures to assimilate other cultures. · Demonstrating respect for cultural leaders and local practices by the state. · Showing respect for traditional authorities and allowing them at least a symbolic role in local affairs. · Either avoiding declaring an official language, or declaring several. · Exercising sensitivity on such issues as removing monuments meaningful to certain ethnic/regional groups. Political CSBMs Within a country, political measures such as power-sharing, proportional recruitment and allocation, electoral reform, and decentralization of power to various localities and regions can also act as political confidence-building measures. Political institutions that encourage bargaining and political accommodation produce an ongoing set of political exchange relationships and reciprocities that result in political learning among rival parties.

*Cost considerations*		Many CSBMs are inexpensive. Furthermore, because they may lead to changed understandings of a country's security needs, CSBMs may permit a reduction in external or internal security expenditures.

*Other resource considerations*		CSBMs require technologies for maintaining direct, regular and quick communication and monitoring among governments and militaries, including provisions for simultaneous translation. These measures may make use of an unbiased third party, most likely foreign, to help monitor and observe. The third party can nurture joint problem solving by identifying key issues that can serve to build confidence and common purpose during the period of implementation of an accord.

*Set-up time*		The time taken in negotiations and signing of CSBMs can vary greatly. However, once CSBMs are signed, implementation often begins immediately.

*Timeframe to see results*		Some CSBMs are short-term. For example, military observers can be dispatched to the areas of potential conflict to collect relevant military information and detect preparations for attack, providing timely information about the intentions of one side to dispel suspicions and calm fears of the other side. Other CSBMs are long-term tools, such as semi-permanent observers who can confirm that the military situation is stable and not being changed abruptly.

Conflict Context *Stages of conflict*		CSBMs are most effective at the early stage of a conflict, or to prevent recurrence in the aftermath of a conflict. CSBMs are least likely between countries or parties who are actively engaged in violent conflict. For both inter- and intra-state conflicts, CSBMs can confirm and reinforce relations of basic mutual trust where they already exist, and can expedite accommodations and rapprochements already in progress in other policy spheres.

*Type of conflict*		CSBMs may be especially useful in mitigating or preventing violent ethnic conflicts within states such as over minority rights; conflict between states arising from refugee problems; border disputes; disputes over boundaries of economic zones; problems with transit by citizens of one country through another; conflicts over minority rights; or suspected or actual clandestine support of political opposition. CSBMs can also be used within a single country, for example, when a series of CSBMs cumulatively encourages rivals to sustain and abide by peace agreements. CSBMs can be links between state and non-state actors, e.g., ethnic minorities, to help overcome their mistrust of state power.

*Causes of conflict*		CSBMs can be thought of as preventive actions to thwart the unraveling of accords, acting not only to resolve conflicts but also to help structure future relations to facilitate the transition to peace and lead to normal non-violent relations. For interstate conflicts, CSBMs primarily address operational prevention: they are unlikely to alter the existing balance of power between countries or to resolve issues or conflicts between them, although they can help to enhance a cooperative atmosphere in which such disputes might be resolved. Where conflicts have deep historical roots, military cooperation may not be feasible, but non-military areas of cooperation can be explored such as joint economic development and environmental projects.

*Prerequisites*		The most important condition for building confidence is recognition of the importance of a relationship, commitment to its sustenance and a mutual willingness to invest in it. For intra-state CSBMs, both state and non-state actors need enlightened, effective leadership; party leadership must be able to maintain control of their followers. Several specialists insist that effective CSBMs require acceptance by all parties to the conflict—formal recognition of the other side is a precondition for establishing confidence, whether between states, societies, or individuals, and with internal conflicts, formal government recognition of the non-government parties to the conflict (as well as recognition by the non-government parties that the government is legitimate) may be in question. However, others counter that the most important condition for building confidence through CSBMs is recognition of the importance of a relationship and a mutual willingness to invest in it. Some degree of political good will is required since effective CSBMs require cooperation. The greater the areas of cooperation, the easier it is for states or parties to resolve disputes without violence. The parties involved must accept the need for mutual security and for preserving the territorial status quo regardless of existing disputes between them. Each has to accept certain historical conditions as given and discern specific advantages of military and other types of cooperation to their own side's interests. While not necessary conditions, CSBMs have been shown to have greater chances of success if countries or parties can readily identify common interests and have the following factors in common: · Historical experience · Cultural and religious heritage · Similar form of social and political organization · Strong states or other strong administrative structure · Stable governments · Civil control of the military · Effective multilateral institutions in other issue areas · Approximately equal military forces. CSBMs are most likely to contribute to a normalization in relations where the terms of the pact are clear and accepted by both sides, intra-party coalitions remain stable, and the international community is firmly supportive.

Past Practice *Within the Greater Horn*		CSSDCA. The Africa Leadership Forum proposed the formation of a Conference on Stability, Security, and Development Cooperation (CSSDCA) to help address Africa's economic and political crises. To promote regional cooperation, it urged states to formulate confidence-building measures such as exchanges of information on troop locations and movement, joint military training, and joint studies and seminars on sub-regional and regional security. The Forum suggested that African states sign non-aggression treaties as a basis for demilitarization and collective reductions in military expenditure, manpower, and armaments. The focus on demilitarization as part of confidence-building mechanisms proceeds from the proposition that arms races breed regional conflicts. Also, states in peaceful and secure regions would likely welcome reduced defense spending to shift resources to the civilian economy. Tanzania-Uganda Mogadishu Agreement of 1972. After tensions escalated between the two countries over the activities of Ugandan exiles in Tanzania and incursions into Tanzania by Idi Amin's forces in response, the October 1972 Mogadishu Agreement arranged a peace agreement between the two countries that included the following confidence-building provisions: · Cessation of military operations against each other's territory and withdrawal of all military forces to ten miles behind their common border. · Halting hostile propaganda. · Refraining from allowing subversion from one country against the other. Although this agreement broke down completely with the onset of the 1978 war, it reduced tensions between the two countries for awhile.

*Outside the Greater Horn*		CSBMs under the CSCE, 1975-90. The current forms and practices of CSBMs emerged from East-West detente in the early 1970s, and thus are most extensive in Western and Eastern Europe. Initial confidence-building measures involved notification and access agreements for reducing the risk of surprise attacks as part of Helsinki Final Act, signed in 1975 by 33 countries that were members of NATO or the Warsaw Pact, and neutral and non-aligned countries that included the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union and countries in Western and Eastern Europe. The Final Act also established the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which subsequently undertook a series of meetings that adopted further CSBMs. The OSCE Code of Conduct (Budapest, 1994) addressed principles on the use of force in peacetime and in internal conflicts including democratic civilian control of the armed forces; to ensure, through use of national democratic procedures, that a country's defense potential was commensurate with its defense needs; adequate use of force, and preventing damage to civilians. It specifically banned the use of force against national and ethnic minorities, and deployment of foreign forces was only made acceptable on the basis of voluntary agreements. A 1990 Vienna document called for various forms of military-to-military contacts, including exchanges of visits by military delegations and senior officers, and establishing contacts among military headquarters, liaison teams and ensuring permanent communication. In the confidence-building area, the CSCE followed a method of self-imposed peer pressure. Having little in the way of a secretariat or bureaucracy until the 1990s, CSCE members met periodically to establish certain goals in each issue area. These meetings typically lasted a month or longer. The resulting agreements were politically but not legally binding, with no means of enforcement. However, each party made a commitment to comply. Review of members' accomplishments in meeting their commitments during summit meetings every two years provided a form of peer pressure for enforcement. By its involvement in various functional issues such as human rights, rule of law, security and economic cooperation, the CSCE demonstrates how cooperation in one sphere can bolster achievement in others. The Helsinki Final Act. Signed in 1975 by 33 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Warsaw Pact, and neutral and non-aligned countries (NNA) countries, the Final Act inaugurated a series of East-West confidence and security building measures established under the Conference for CSCE from 1975 to 1990. "First generation" measures involved notification and access agreements for reducing the risk of surprise attacks. The "second generation" increased the restraints on military postures and deployments and governed dangerous nuclear activities. Communications Hotlines. In 1991, India and Pakistan re-ratified an agreement signed after the 1972 war which involves a communications hotline between commanders governing troop maneuvers, joint patrols of common borders, and a pledge not to launch preemptive attacks. In 1991, South and North Korea adopted hotlines and prior notification of military maneuvers. Arab-Israeli Conflict. According to one specialist, CSBMs played a critical role at every stage in the negotiation of security arrangements between Israel and Egypt. Measures such as demilitarized zones, the interposition of international observer forces, establishing direct communications, and joint consultative commissions to resolve disputes over the interpretation of data have helped to resolve Egyptian and Israeli dilemmas of cooperation. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Protocol. ECOWAS adopted a protocol in 1978 to allay fears of any aggression of one country against another. Its 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense Matters created a joint defense council of the heads of state and a joint defense commission comprising defense ministers. Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). SADCC was formed in 1980 by nine countries. Although designed primarily to increase economic cooperation among the members and reduce dependence on South Africa, it also included a code of conduct that urged members to refrain from expansion and occupation of each other's territory and from serving as a base of support for subversion. Mutual Security Measures. In late November 1995, the leaders of Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, and Uganda agreed to mutual security measures such as closing their borders to militias and ferreting out ethnic extremists. This action was part of a plan facilitated by former US President Jimmy Carter to alleviate the threat of increasing ethnic unrest posed by Rwandan refugees in Zaire.

Evaluation *Strengths*		CSBMs can start small and proceed gradually as the parties are willing to address new issues. Even small gains and incremental changes can be useful and should be pursued. A number of confidence-building measures in the cultural, political, and military spheres can contribute to the political legitimacy of agreements and give support to the building of enduring institutions."

Weaknesses

Although most regions have some CSBM initiatives, their respective politics and interests limit the scope of issues around which they address functional issues—for example, the Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) first took up human rights and then expanded into security, while the OAS stated with security and only recently moved into human rights.

CSBMs are less likely to be effective if some parties are militarily dominant and use this power to intimidate or coerce others.

CSBMs were originally developed during the Cold War in East-West relations. East-West CSBMs were focused on states, national militaries, and on stabilizing a status quo that both sides were unwilling to challenge at the risk of direct confrontation, especially war. Some specialists caution against applying the East-West experience with CSBMs to other regions without detailed consideration of local circumstances where CSBMs must address issues of intracommunal violence as much or more than questions of miliary deployments, and be developed in a setting in which recognition of the other is itself either in question or an essential trump in negotiations on peace and security.

There is debate over whether CSBMs can be seen as a framework for enhancing stability throughout a region, or as only marginally helpful in highly specific situations and circumstances.

CSBMs are ill-advised if parties flagrantly flout widely-accepted international or regional standards.

CSBMs depend on the voluntary compliance of signatories.

CSBMs cannot be seen as a framework for enhancing stability throughout a region; instead, they are marginally helpful in highly specific situations and circumstances.

*Lessons learned*		Military CSBMs are most likely to succeed and be sustained when augmented with political and other CSBMs. CSBMs can be precursors to further cooperation in other spheres and indicate a commitment to future peaceful co-existence. CSBMs are more difficult to achieve if major powers outside the region are in competition with each other for influence in the region and try to exert pressures on regional governments, thus increasing divisions among them. In contrast, support from countries outside the region to set up CSBMs can help increase the political will of regional countries to attain a successful agreement. CSBM agreements require careful selection of realistic areas of agreement and detailed specification of their enforcement to provide incentives for compliance. CSBMs need to be even-handed so one side does not gain undue advantage over another. The introduction of CSBMs should be linked with other conflict management processes such as negotiations and peacekeeping.

References and resources		Gabriel Ben-Dor and David B. Dewitt (ed.) , Confidence-Building Measures in the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994). Cathleen S. Fisher, "The Pre-Conditions of Confidence Building: Lessons from the European Experience," Draft Paper, no date. Michael Krepon, handbook, Augustine P. Mahiga, and Fidelia M. Nji, Confidence-Building Measures in Africa, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (New York: United Nations, 1987). Alan Platt (ed.), Arms Control and Confidence Building in the Middle East (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1992).