Description

Police reform and professionalization comprise efforts to create a civil police institution, distinct from the military, responsible for internal security.

Objectives

Police reform aims to create a "more dispersed, visible, accessible, and service-oriented force which interacts freely and gently with its community" and sees its primary duty as protecting citizens.

Professionalization aims to make the police more effective, strengthening police forces’ capability to enforce the law and to maintain public order with a minimum of physical force by developing leadership, organization and administration; training systems; transportation and communications systems and training technicians to operate and maintain these systems; appropriate equipment; and improved capability to conduct urban, rural and border patrol operation, investigations, and other specialized functions.

Professionalization may integrate efforts to depoliticize the police, making the force politically autonomous and responsive to community needs. In some cases, police reform and professionalization may involve unifying various local forces and/or incorporating members of underrepresented ethnic and political groups into the police force.

Expected outcome or impact

A professionalized police force is accountable and law-abiding, humane, and closely integrated into the civilian community. It is organized hierarchically and managed from the top down; it is adequately trained, equipped and rewarded.

A professionalized police force provides a check on the state’s autonomy: police professionalization is a critical component in broadly participatory, genuinely competitive electoral systems, impartial judiciaries, government legitimacy, office-holder accountability to the public, and overall political and economic development.

Relationship to conflict prevention and mitigation

The police are a powerful political institution whose activities are crucial to maintaining order, stability, and states’ domination over their citizens. Effective, fair policing and humane civil disturbance control capability are necessary for stability, order, conflict prevention and mitigation and political and economic development.

The way the police enforce law and order influences how citizens view justice and the state’s legitimacy. A police force which fairly protects people and their property, helps people in times of emergency, abides by the rule of law and uses violence as a last resort will "reduce unrest, lead to fewer riots and lessen the chance that malcontents can stir up and organize subversion or insurrection."

Police forces in many African countries are: · Understaffed.

· Underequipped.

· Poorly trained, with few professional police skills.

· Lacking modern administrative procedures and technical skills.

· Have difficulty attracting and keeping qualified personnel, especially at the higher levels.

· Known to over-rely on force, including forcing confessions from prisoners.

· Lacking effective communications, transportation, and record-keeping systems which isolates police posts from effective supervision and leaves them excessive discretion in their routine activities.

· Frequently used for the protection of specific interests and order.

· More associated with the pomp and circumstance of power than with preserving law and order.

African countries frequently have several local police forces in different regions which are biased toward particular ethnic and political groups and provide uneven service and protection, which can further aggravate conflict.

Implementation

Organizers

Police reform can be organized by governments using domestic resources and knowledge. International support for police reform can be requested or proffered.

Participants

Former government military police members, former members of insurgent forces, and civilian police force members can participate in efforts to reform police and to create a new, professional, civilian police force.

Activities

Police reform should begin by evaluating the state of and needs for internal security. This initial assessment should be followed by periodic monitoring and evaluation visits during implementation and for several years following the police reform program to assess reform progress, determine further needs and conduct final evaluations. The specific mix of police reform and professionalization programs and equipment should be tailored to a country’s capacity to take over programs and to begin paying for services and equipment from its own resources.

Professionalization measures include:

· Adopting and enforcing a code of police conduct.

· Exposing all ranks to professional values.

· Higher recruitment standards, with emphasis on minimal levels of education and literacy.

¨More efficient manpower development, including:  Improved basic and in-service training programs.

¨ Creating or expanding police training academies and staff colleges.

¨ Developing curricula, courses and indigenous staff to take over teaching duties from expatriate advisors.

¨ Training in technical skills to operate, maintain and repair any new equipment.

¨ Training in non-abusive operational techniques.

· Improved management procedures, including:

¨ Moves to unify various local forces and their organization under a centralized command.

¨ Reorganizing to create an administrative structure with clear, hierarchical line and staff functions.

¨ Increasing police leadership’s management and long-range planning capabilities.

¨ Instituting systems to distinguish and reward support staff.

· Improving equipment, transportation and communication systems; equipment should be selected so that it can be operated, maintained and repaired by personnel with minimal training.

· Efforts to establish effective community relations so that law enforcement agencies can receive greater public support.

· Allocating police to border patrol duties to stem the flow of smugglers, migrations, and refugees.

· Enhancing urban and rural operations skills.

· Improving humane civil disturbance control capabilities.

· Training specialized units such as criminal investigation units, counter-narcotics units, and VIP protection units.

· Establishing effective, responsible riot control capabilities, including special training, command, and equipment emphasizing crowd dispersal and protective gear rather than firepower and weaponry, either as a separate paramilitary force (a traditional French practice, common in francophone African states) or a riot control unit within the civil force.

Advisors may be stationed in-country for anywhere from a few months to a few years to supervise the force’s utilization of any equipment provided; to train operators and maintenance personnel; to establish maintenance and training facilities; and to advise and offer assistance on general matters of police management or special procedures. Advisors may be assisted by local police officers specifically assigned to act as liaisons and general guides. Advisors are often professional law enforcement officers in their home countries, recruited for their extensive, general police experience or specialized or technical skills in electronics, vehicle maintenance, logistics or weapons identification.

International police reform assistance can incorporate the following elements.

· Cooperation among police forces in fighting crime with international aspects—smuggling, drug traffic, terrorism—through international organizations such as Interpol, regional meetings or bilateral arrangements.

· The formation of professional associations for senior level officers to exchange perspectives and ideas.

· Exchanges and visits by working officers with forces in other countries.

· Dissemination of research and scholarly reports.

· Provision of consultants to police forces.

· Bilateral assistance programs between developed and developing countries.

· Advocating police reforms; for example, the UN has sponsored a number of Congresses, regional meetings, research efforts and institutions which focus on problems of crime and criminal justice, including police forces, and has drafted resolutions calling for higher police standards and an international code of police conduct, ethics and behavior.

Post-conflict police reform. Internal police forces should receive immediate attention to create an organizational environment that enhances civilian control to support the transition to peace following the negotiated end to a protracted civil war. "Balanced or more concurrent reorganization of the military and police forces frequently occurs following armed conflict, and is most effectively managed by civilian officials experienced in controlling armed forces."

· Foreign military forces can provide useful assistance, especially when the new government is working to dismantle or drastically reform the security apparatus (military and police).

· Sub-regional and collective security arrangements can support post-conflict police reform efforts.

· International police monitors that accompany interim security forces can:

¨ Oversee and assist in the process of vetting candidates to weed out abusers from interim security forces.

¨ Provide on-the-job training.

¨ Provide technical assistance to establish and train new civilian public security forces, including instructing at police training academies.

¨ Offer alternative models for police behavior.

Short-term priorities include:

· Establishing and training effective internal discipline units such as inspector general offices and discipline boards.

· Supporting the creation and training of independent human rights ombudsman offices, civilian review boards, and other kinds of civilian oversight and NGO monitoring bodies.

Medium and long term tasks include:

· Revising the security forces’ mission and doctrine.

· Strengthening civilian control of the police, including training in new doctrine and assisting with reform of police education and training.

· Providing training for civilian leaders in security matters.

· Assisting the national government in evaluating the police to ensure they meet performance and human rights criteria.

Domestic political will and institutions. Sustainable interventions in police reform in a post-conflict period require governmental, quasi-governmental, and non-governmental domestic institutions with the capacity and interest to pursue the security reform agenda. The international community’s ability to reform these forces without strong domestic commitment is limited. Donors should gauge the extent of the civilian administration’s political will before committing resources to assist police reform and throughout the implementation process. The following questions can measure the degree of domestic political will.

· Has the government named reform-minded officials to key posts?

· Do these officials have sufficient power and commitment to confront those who oppose reforms?

· Is the new force engaged in abuses? How willing and able are the leaders to discipline and prosecute abusers?

· What is the track record of the public order forces in investigating cases of political violence and organized crime?

· How transparent are the defense and security budgets? Do the civilian population and legislative bodies have the authority to evaluate the budgets?

Cost considerations

The cost of police reform depends on the combination of interventions required. Costs may include training, technical assistance, international advisors, transportation and equipment for forensics, crime laboratories, communications and computers.

Other resource considerations

Police reform can require experienced trainers and technical assistants.

Set-up time

Timeframe to see results

Achieving professional performance takes time. In the transition period following a civil conflict, the time required for reforms to be effective is often far longer than the accords provide. It is impossible to create a new professional police force in one year; in three to five years a structure can be in place, but officers will remain poorly trained.

Conflict context

Stages of conflict

Police reform and professionalization efforts can occur at any stage of conflict. A post-conflict transition or a transition to democracy can present a window of opportunity.

Type of conflict

Police reform is appropriate to any conflict where unfairness or abuses in the internal security apparatus contribute to the conflict.

Causes of conflict

Genuine police reform and professionalization addresses the structural causes of conflict.

Prerequisites

Political will—among domestic political leaders and within the international community to pressure the government into maintaining the reform process—is necessary.

Foreign planners and implementors must understand the political realities within the countries and police forces they are assisting before attempting police reform.

Police reform efforts should be combined and coordinated with judicial reform; without improvement in the judicial system, little will result from the funds and time invested in police retraining.

Past practice

Outside the Greater Horn

Former US Public Safety Assistance to Africa. According to a 1973 study, programs sponsored by US Office of Public Safety (OPS) (formerly an office within USAID, terminated in 1973 by Congress) to 14 African countries improved the general performance of local forces; increased forces’ technical proficiency and utilization of equipment; improved administrative and training practices; contributed to a trend of increasing professional attitude among police as demonstrated by some attempts to curb corruption, improved public relations, less resort to force, and more courteous treatment of suspects; improved internal security; and reduced political use of police forces. However, most of the information in this study came from the OPS advisors and selected groups such as higher rank police officials, national leaders, and other powerful elites, all of whom were biased in their assessments. The study also lacked a consideration of the social and political context.

Another study concluded that US police assistance to sub-Saharan African states between 1954 and 1974 "failed to achieve their political goals or make any significant beneficial or harmful impact on police forces in African states." Reasons include the complexity of planning, implementing and evaluating assistance programs; contradictions between goals in OPS programs, civil institution-building and counter-insurgency, and frequently changes in goals during implementation. Equipment provided worked at first but fell into disuse when spare parts and training were reduced. Training reached middle and higher level officers "but suffered from superficiality, too much emphasis on anti-Communist rhetoric, and too much sightseeing. The most common mistake was to overestimate the capacity of foreign police assistance to make a difference and to underestimate obstacles to successful implementation and impact. For example, even when a reform effort alters a force’s structure, modernizes equipment, and establishes schools, police roles, functions and behavior may remain unchanged."

Haiti. Multinational forces were required to accept the Haitian military as the internal security force. This produced a dilemma. The military had to be converted into an interim police force while responsible for protecting citizens’ security; "the same police who were at one time repressors cannot become the guardians of incipient democracy... Window dressing will not fool the public; old wine in new bottles still tastes like vinegar." Eventually the UN, with US assistance, brought in civilian police to safeguard the security environment that led to the creation of a new Haitian National Police Force. The new force lacks leadership; this leadership vacuum challenges the international community to continue monitoring the HNP so that the repressive habits of the past are not repeated. An important influence on helping this police reform effort to succeed, however is that the Haitian political environment was more open and participatory than at any other time in that nation’s history.

Nigeria. Nigeria’s military government made moves to unify and standardize police services in the country; qualified forces were absorbed into the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) by 1967 in the West and by 1972 in the North. Unification reduced northern political support for the government and revealed a North-South split, with northern elites fearing losing their local police force and being intimidated by NPF who were dominated by two rival ethnic groups. The 1968 Police Act established specific regulations governing police conduct, from the proper format of station ledger books to a code of conduct. Police employment for the rank and file pays comparatively well, is secure, and other work for their training and skills is limited (candidates for officer rank, being university graduates, are more difficult to attract and keep due to their opportunities elsewhere, especially technical personnel). The Police Act, and subsequent addenda and amendments, lodge vast powers in supervisory staff. However, several factors offset the ability of police superiors to control their subordinates: there is little hope for promotion or salary increase; the force is widely dispersed; inadequate communications and transportation equipment makes continuous supervision difficult. There is actually little direct supervision once officers leave the station for patrol.

According to Nigerian observers, the police do not provide much in the way of services (protection, crime prevention, order maintenance, services of an emergency nature); inaction is a common police response. Many of the police often seem more interested in selectively enforcing the law (at "lucrative posts") against groups who have little power and are easy victims. "Only insistence, status, or a direct command by a superior seem to lead to the provision of police services." The NPF remains badly understaffed, underequipped, and ineffectively deployed. Shortages of manpower and equipment contribute to police inability to deal effectively with crowds and rioting. These problems cause police inaction, selective order enforcement (neglect of crime and services), attention to personal gain, deference to superiors and the powerful (when superiors cannot be avoided), and orientation toward self-interest.

El Salvador. Security forces were mainly involved in political repression during the military government (1932-1979), and following the limited transition to civilian rule in 1982. "Security forces at the local level were very closely associated with powerful landowners, functioning virtually as private security forces, with barracks sometimes actually located on large private farms." The forces were highly politicized, not good at policing, lacked investigative skills, lacked the most basic skills for protecting, recording and using evidence, and were fundamentally hostile to individual rights in a democratic society, relying on vigilance and intimidation to maintain order. "The old security forces seldom obtained convictions and gave little attention to crime."

The January 1992 Chapultepec peace accords, ending the civil war between the government and the Farabundo Martí Liberation Front (FMLN), called for the complete elimination of the existing public security forces—the National Guard, Treasury Police, and National Police (PN), and the paramilitary patrol structure in the countryside—and specified the institutional and legal framework for creating a completely new National Civilian Police (PNC) force, with the timetable for its development and deployment. The accord also provided for the creation of a human rights ombudsman’s office with broad powers to investigate rights violations, to inspect police and military facilities without advance notice, and to refer cases to the courts. The judicial system was also to be reformed. The bulk of the new police force (60 percent) would be civilians with no prior military or police experience; relatively few personnel (20 percent) would be from the former military-controlled security forces; and former FMLN members would be able to participate in the PNC (20 percent) without discrimination providing they met admissions standards.

The international community provided unprecedented levels of technical assistance, training, on-the-job supervision, and material assistance. Constitutional reforms included in the peace accords prohibited the armed forces from participating in internal security, except under emergency conditions and with approval of the Legislative Assembly. The PNC was to be a completely new, civilian-controlled institution with a new training academy, a new doctrine emphasizing the protection of individual rights and minimal use of force, and a majority of personnel who had not participated, on either side, in the armed conflict. The development of the PNC in El Salvador "represented a critical test of how rapidly and effectively civilian policing could be established, and of how the international community could contribute to such a process of institutional development." PNC agents, inspectors, and commissioners were to be better educated than personnel of the previous security forces, with higher levels of professional police training. After an initial transition period, PNC personnel would live in their own homes as part of the civilian community rather than apart in barracks. The accord discussed in detail the PNC doctrine, structure, functions, personnel and training. The doctrine gives highest priority to the protection of individual rights, to minimum use of force, and absolute adherence to apolitical conduct. "The law and doctrine regulating the new police, and the curriculum of the new academy, conform to modern standards for police conduct, accountability, and democratic civilian control and were specifically designed to uphold the spirit and letter of the peace accords." The law, doctrine, and curriculum were developed with extensive participation of an international technical advisory team including civilian police officials and academy administrators. Implementation was monitored by a Salvadoran agency created by the accords, the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), comprised of representatives of political parties and a UN observer mission (ONUSAL).

"The importance of the police reform to the overall peace process, and the urgency of completing the transition from the old force to the new during the brief tenure of the UN observer mission, led to an extremely ambitious timetable—three and a half months—for development of the ANSP." Delays occurred almost immediately. Devising a curriculum took longer than anticipated; the government initially failed to provide funds for recruitment and operating costs; organizational problems arose with the recruitment and testing processes; international donors, concerned with the government’s lack of commitment, withheld funds; and the military refused to hand over the existing public security academy, requiring additional time and funds to refurbish a facility. The number of applicants was low during the first two years, initially because of a lack of publicity and later because of low police salaries and perception of greater opportunities elsewhere. An additional problem was that ANSP admissions were governed by a government-controlled Academic Council. The quality of ANSP training has been mixed, shortchanging some aspects of training. "The first PNC delegations to deploy quickly showed that they did not know how to deal with common policing situations." The US Justice Department’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) responded to some of the problems, but firearms training and knowledge of the use of force, and poor training in specifics of criminal procedure and legal norms persisted; ONUSAL officials blame the latter for contributing to several lapses in due process and human rights violations. The rapid timetable for preparing a basic public security force did not allow time or resources to develop the capacity to provide the specialized training required for carrying out the PNC’s divisional functions. These gaps were gradually overcome by bringing in foreign instructors and sending some PNC personnel abroad for specialized training and to become ANSP instructors. "Although members of the PNC began their work with great enthusiasm and voluntarism, the poor working and living conditions and lack of sufficient material support compromised the new force’s ability to perform its job effectively and establish a positive reputation for itself." However, "ex-PN, ex-FMLN, and civilian personnel in the PNC showed remarkable capacity to work effectively and cooperatively as professionals alongside one another, giving the PNC in its first six months the reputation of being one of the most important and effective venues of national reconciliation." The PNC initially made significant strides toward earning popular confidence; in new areas the PNC found it necessary to orient people to its new way of operating by holding meetings to explain its community service approach and to warn people to discontinue infractions and bribery attempts. Problems were created by the disconnect of higher police performance overloading a not-yet-reformed judicial system and interfering with law enforcement.

During the first 6 months ONUSAL played a crucial role helping compensate for the lack of equipment by providing the bulk of transportation and communications ability. ONUSAL police observers accompanied PNC in their duties, helping fill training gaps and compensating for their lack of experience.

Setbacks in the reform effort were mostly due to expediency. Appointment of an ex-military officer as sub-director for PNC operations (due to his experience) violated accord stipulations that the PNC be commanded by civilians and was disastrous; his political bias, militarism, and disregard for human rights eroded efforts at building democratic values in the PNC (he eventually resigned under pressure from the US and UN, but only after severe damage, including suspending ONUSAL’s training role for several months). Another harmful decision was including hundreds of detectives and technical support personnel from the former Special Investigative Unit (SIU) and the Anti-Narcotics Unit (UEA); most performed badly, had problems adapting, and resigned en masse; this lost time and required starting from scratch to create an investigative division.

The PNC’s human rights performance is far superior to that of the former security forces, although "the Salvadoran experience shows that a transition to civilian policing does not necessarily mean a transition to an accountable police force." The most common complaints were violation of due process and excessive force in responding to public demonstrations, labor strikes and protests, partly attributable to the slow development of institutions of accountability (partly due to government reticence, partly to priority placed on rapid deployment of operational units).

During the transition reports of crime skyrocketed, especially armed robbery and murders, often carried out with weapons of war—automatic weapons and grenades—partly because of the marked drop in public security personnel from the war years. Crime problems pressured the government to take strong measures to protect citizens; the government responded by delaying PN demobilization and transferring members of other former security forces into the PN (until stopped by the UN). In 1993 the government began to allow increased involvement of the military in internal security, eroding the important demarcation between external defense and internal security responsibilities. This was initiated by the government executives, not by the military, which actually even resisted some policing duties. However, the military cannot be characterized as supportive, resisting providing resources to the PNC as directed, and military leaders publicly accusing the PNC of inability to provide security and speculating the military might in the future regain a public security role. Public confidence in PNC abilities to fight crime plummeted in 1994 and 1995.

"One of the more difficult aspects of the police reform effort in El Salvador was the relatively slow movement by groups in civil society — human rights NGOs, community organizations, unions, think tanks, the business community, journalists, etc. — to determine their role in the process." The dearth of civilian specialists on crime, policing and public security planning probably contributed to the Ministry of Public Security’s ad hoc policies, demonstrating the international community’s limited influence on security reform and the difficulties in overcoming a legacy of security policies being the exclusive domain of police and military institutions. The transition difficulties demonstrate the dilemma that to build support for its deployment and budget, excluding the military from internal security roles, and the timely demobilization of the former militarized police, a new civilian police force must demonstrate its effectiveness, to counter claims of the military and former police of their necessity to maintain public order. But the new force requires various resources, training and funds to carry out their new roles. In this case, while neither the government nor the international community had sufficient resources, one account says PNC members themselves compensated for such shortfalls with their exceptional dedication and voluntarism during the early days.

The plan to create a wholly new institution increased the chances of breaking old patterns of abuse and impunity, and for the PNC to remain independent from the military. "The accords created an environment in which significant international attention and resources were devoted to carrying out, advising, and observing the project; in which the international community had an important stake in the outcome; and in which the government was at least somewhat accountable to the UN for carrying out the project..." "From promising beginnings, the El Salvador police project developed into a cautionary tale about the crucial importance of political will for developing new police institutions, the difficulty civilian governments have in enforcing their independence from militaries, and the limited weight of international pressures relative to domestic political considerations." The government’s lack of political will in supporting the new force and its attempts to undercut the PNC’s civilian nature, despite intense international involvement and scrutiny is "a very sobering lesson," demonstrating the need for government political will (or the ability to pressure the government in various ways to abide by accord requirements). Another lesson is the need for consideration of how the state can deal with crime during the transition from one security regime to another. This case also demonstrates the need for immediately setting up mechanisms of accountability and control along with deploying operational units, and of excluding members of previous abusive, militarized forces.

Evaluation

Strengths

Weaknesses

The impact of foreign police assistance on the quality of law enforcement and the protection of interests in Africa historically is difficult to assess because there are little data releasable to the public to establish a baseline on police performance—arrest rates, crime rates, effectiveness in controlling crime, ensuring public order, or providing services.

"The impact, for good or bad, of police assistance is likely to be small and will be determined by the wishes and actions of people primarily affected by such aid. Police aid is just another resource in local political struggles."

Supporting security forces and strengthening law and order, including police forces, is often a difficult and sensitive area for donors.

In practice, civilian regimes have found it relatively difficult to wrest control of internal security from the military. Internal security has ususally been demilitarized when the military was politically weak when civilians took office.

Political events often complicate efforts to improve police standards.

A "pervasiveness of the psychology of force in many rank and file" is a common problem among police in less than professional forces. It is easier to teach techniques than to change attitudes and institutional norms in reforming the police.

The police in many African countries tend to protect the powerful: they are highly visible during ceremonial occasions guarding VIPs; are assigned to guard the homes of the powerful, government buildings, and act as bodyguards for important officials; and mostly exist in urban areas. "Such practices teach the rank and file who needs protection and who does not, who is entitled and whose demands can be rejected." Long-standing problems of corruption and use of police powers for personal gain or abuse are difficult to eradicate. Efforts to professionalize police may be frustrated by pervasive illiteracy and lack of formal education, existing practices which resist change, and political interference.

Police tend to adopt an "us against them" mentality, which produces powerful incentives for conformity with the existing police culture, reinforcing existing practices and encouraging resistance to change.

Contradictory goals—counter-insurgency vs. institution-building, paramilitary vs. civil force—has led to incompatible priorities and programs.

Lessons learned

When internal security institutions are interlinked with the military, police tend to view the free political expression and organization that underlie democratic politics as a threat to the state, making repression likely and jeopardizing a new deomcracy’s capacity to channel discontent into the political system instead of into violent conflict. Separating internal security institutions completely from national defense institutions is an important step for preventing and mitigating violent conflict and for deepening democracy. Effective police reforms require a much longer commitment than the 3-5 years generally provided in a peace accord.

Security reform requires political will within the national government; post-conflict assistance efforts for the entire reconstruction process should be conditioned on demonstrations of political will by the government, especially in the area of security reform. The international community can play a crucial role in helping support new civilian police forces until they can prove themselves and gain sufficient domestic political support to offset the more established constituency of the military.

"Professional policing works not so much because of the particular techniques or organizational structures it embodies but because of the attitudes of people who do the work... Most difficult to transfer is the idea of a police force interested in protecting general public order."

Past international community efforts to reform police paid insufficient inattention to establishing mechanisms to address internal discipline in new public order forces.

References and resources

O. Marenin, "Policing African States: Toward a Critique," Comparative Politics 14/4 (1982):379-396.

_____. 1985. "Policing in Nigeria: Control and Autonomy in the Exercise of Coercion." African Studies Review 28/1:73-93.

_____. 1986. "United States Aid to African Police Forces" African Affairs 85/341:509-544.

William Stanley, Risking Failure:The Problems and Promise of the New Civilian Police Force in El Salvador, Washington, DC, Hemisphere Initiatives and Washington Office on Latin America, September 1993.

_____. Building a New Civilian Police Force in El Salvador", Chapter 5 in Krishna Kumar (ed.), Rebuilding Societies After Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1997.

Laurie Nathan, "Human Rights, Reconciliation and Conflict in Independent Namibia: The Formation of the Namibian Army and Police Force," in Kupar Rupesinghe (ed.), International Conflict and Governance, London: St. Martin’s Press, 1992, pp. 152-168.

Making Peace Work: Lessons for the International Development Community, Conference Report, Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, May 9, 1996.

University of the Western Cape (for reports on South African police reform).

Institute for Defense Studies (for reports on South African police reform).Douglas Farah, "Salvadorans Complain Postwar Crime Defeating Rebuilt Police Force," The Washington Post, March 15, 1995, p. 24.