Description

Central state power is decentralized through administrative arrangements such as devolution, deconcentration, regional autonomy and federalism that separate groups into distinct political units, each responsible for specified functions.

Objectives

Decentralization is designed to create a political environment in which power to access political, economic, and social resources is distributed between the central government and lower levels of government.

Expected outcome or impact

Political groups and parties gain more autonomy to pursue their interests and govern their own geographical or influential territories by assuming some of the powers of the central government. Federalism, a form of decentralization, distributes power between the central government and lower levels in a regulated manner (through the constitution or other means), by which it "spreads state authority among a wide array of key actors, making politics less threatening and therefore encouraging joint problem-solving."

Relationship to conflict prevention and mitigation

Decentralization creates a fairer political ground, protects group and individual human rights, establishes checks and balances to central power, avoids winner-take-all political competition, and prevents political violence among rival groups. By dispersing limited powers to lower levels of government, decentralization schemes may reduce conflict by giving current and prospective leaders at the lower levels greater power and incentives to cooperate.

Decentralizing central government can help deter a state’s internal use of coercive power against political opposition, especially if combined with other political liberalization steps. Decentralization can mean formal recognition of the legitimacy of ethno-regional claims to power which "encourages moderate behavior, easing tensions and possible resort to violence and secessionist activities." Decentralization can increase non-dominant group representation in local and regional governments, reducing national ethnic conflict.

"Whether and how decentralization occurs is critical to the fate of democratic initiatives, and even political stability, in much of eastern and southern Africa."

Implementation

Organizers

The central government and opposition groups decentralize power. The international community, a multilateral institution or a country trusted by both sides, can serve as a mediator.

Participants

Activities

Designing a decentralization effort begins by analyzing the current distribution of power and its effects, followed by negotiations among possible power-takers and consultation among actually or potentially conflicting groups. Open and frequent negotiations between the central government and regions or political groups are crucial both prior to and during decentralization planning and implementation. Political institutions, including regional governance arrangements, and economic, electoral and military powers may be affected.

The central government can establish provinces or states and grant them legislative and executive powers, entitling them to an equitable share of national revenues as determined by the national legislature, and permit them to levy taxes and surcharges within limits the legislature sets. The provincial legislatures could be vested with the power to make laws for their province in various fields such as agriculture, health services, housing, roads, and traditional authorities. A constitutional amendment granting limited regional autonomy may be needed in situations where the source of conflict is ethnicity or regional strife. A design which creates relatively autonomous sub-regions, along with other institutional mechanisms, could help reassure ethnic minorities of their ability to participate in decisions they regard as important.

Decentralization programs must consider where the state’s non-dominant groups are located since this would affect decisions on the option of regional autonomy or self rule, and on whether any states created would be homogeneous or heterogeneous. Autonomy is a valid policy option, unless the non-dominant group demanding autonomy is close to the national border, which would provoke the central government to fear separatist pressures.

Arrangements to disperse power to lower government levels must be accompanied by local governance capacitation efforts to strengthen regional and local governments and enhance their responsiveness and efficiency. These initiatives are analyzed in a separate profile in this section.

Other resource considerations

Decentralization may require outside negotiators.

An international sponsor for a non-dominant group can help keep pressure on the government to follow through on its commitments.

Set-up time

Decentralization efforts take time and continuous commitment and should be implemented gradually.

Timeframe

to see results

Successful decentralization has long-lasting effects on preventing and mitigating conflict..

Conflict context

Stages of conflict

Efforts to decentralize power can occur at any stage of conflict. Central governments at war are likely to resist acting with opposition political groups in the manner needed unless pressured by the war-weary public or the international community through measures such as conditionality. In such cases, activities to decentralize power can act as a mechanism for settling conflict.

To be most effective, arrangements to decentralize power should be adopted before large-scale violent conflict is underway. Political (democratic) transition and post-conflict transition are opportune times for constitutional and other arrangements toward decentralizing central government power. In designing accords, negotiators can include mechanisms to decentralize power, with an aim to accommodate some ethno-regional demands for a degree of political autonomy within the evolving system.

Type of conflict

Decentralization is especially appropriate for national-level ethnic conflicts.

Causes of conflict

Decentralization schemes address structural conflict prevention.

Prerequisites

Decentralization of power requires an agreement among the central government and opposing factions. Such agreements usually arise after a long period of conflict, often accompanied by international pressure. Central governments generally agree to genuine decentralization arrangements once they no longer perceive it the use of coercion to maintain social stability to be politically and economically cost-effective.

Political will and the support of political leaders of dominant elites and of non-dominant and marginalized groups are essential for decentralization. Donor actions and domestic public pressure can bolster leaders’ political will.

Administrative decentralization is not enough. Local authorities must acquire the skills, knowledge and resources to manage their increased power responsibly before or during a devolution of power to local governments.

Some degree of top-down decision-making is necessary even when decentralization is approached from the bottom up.

Donors should understand where all parties to the conflict stand on making political changes before becoming involved in decentralization schemes.

Decentralization should be accompanied by a reallocation of economic resources—through tax reform, business privatization, market reform, banking law reform, and economic institutional restructuring—and political (liberalization) reforms.

Past practice

Within the Greater Horn

Ethiopia is still involved in undertaking a decentralization experiment began during the period of political and post-conflict transition after Mengistu Haile Marian’s military government was overthrown in 1991. The EPRDF is developing participatory structures at the local level and devolving administrative power away from the center. The Ethiopian state had been over-centralized for decades. The EPRDF believed that progressing with political liberalization required dismantling the over-centralized state. However, EPRDF leadership feared that letting Regions 4 and 5 become too autonomous would run the risk of fracturing those regions from the country. Therefore, the EPRDF maintained it would need "satellite allies" to maintain control over the decentralization process. Now that EPRDF national control has been consolidated and its satellite parties are paramount in key regions, some analysts believe that decentralization can proceed.

Ethiopia’s process is designed as an ethnicity-based federation, devolving administrative responsibilities to nine regions based on nationalities. This "ethnic federalism" has created regional administrations formed largely on the basis of ethnic affiliation. Supporters are encouraged by the recognition of local languages and cultures, welcome the space from the past legacy of central government rule by Shoan Amhara domination, and believe the prior practice of over-centralization to be impractical in a country with such a large territory and population. The EPRDF views "ethnic federalism" as a means, not an end, representing their attempt to prevent domination over the poor majority by a single ethnic group. Critics claim the decentralization scheme is "ethnic politics" which threatens peace, fails to protect minority rights in the regions, and has led to increased divisions among different groups living in the same region. Detractors also accuse the new decentralization arrangements of politicizing ethnicity to the degree that it has become an ideology of opposition and exclusion.

The effort to redraw boundaries according to ethnicity has had some negative consequences. People have been forced from lands that were in their families for generations; there have been ethnic disputes over minerals, lands and water; ethnic segregation imposed from the top has in some cases aggravated relations among multi-ethnic areas which had coexisted peacefully for many generations. In some regions, decentralization will cause weak judicial and police structures not controlled by the central government, poorly formed checks and balances, conflict between regional and central governments over taxation power, and the transfer of government funds from the center to the regions.

In some cases, decentralization efforts have exacerbated ethnic tensions, while in others, increased commerce and access to decision-making structures have reduced long-standing tensions. Minorities in some regions have claimed to be completely marginalized, while in others, zonal administrations allow minorities to exercise control over language, education, culture and village councils.

Other examples. Various forms of federalism accompanied by efforts at local government capacitation have been or are being implemented in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda. In most of these cases, empowering local authority is combined with disseminating (and sometimes forcing adoption) of a particular approach to state reconstruction and popular participation of ordinary citizens in an overall context of directed development.

· In Uganda, with perhaps the longest record of local empowerment, Resistance Councils are in some places an extension of central state security as well as being vehicles for popular participation. There is tremendous local level variation.

· In Eritrea, district and village level baitos (assemblies which have been critical in managing local conflict) and administrative structures were strengthened during the war, and now form the basis of local governance. But the Popular Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) is managing the transition tightly; desires for decentralization are being weighed against potential fault lines inherent in post-independence Eritrean society.

· The Kenyan experience of sending central government officials out to rural areas obstructed democratization and is the opposite of local government capacitation referred to here.

· Efforts to develop local authorities are underway in parts of Somalia, and in southern Sudan (through the SPLM/A).

Outside the Greater Horn

South Africa, 1993. Despite their preference for strong central leadership, ANC negotiators agreed to significant autonomous powers for the regions. ANC leadership recognized that increased regional autonomy would be an inducement to cooperate on the draft constitution for the government/NP, the IFP, and the Afrikaner Volksfront, and therefore negotiated on increasing regional powers. The interim South African Constitution of 1993 established nine provinces with both legislative and executive powers, entitled them to an equitable share of national revenues as determined by an Act of Parliament and, within limits set by parliament, gave them local taxing authority and other significant legislative powers. These relatively autonomous provinces helped reassure ethnic minorities during the transition.

Nigeria. The evidence from Nigeria shows that federalism can exacerbate or mitigate ethnic conflict.

Evaluation

Strengths

Decentralization of power can be effective in divided societies because minority groups can gain a degree of autonomy on critical issues. Ultimately these groups can gain sufficient political, economic, and social autonomy that they become supporters rather than violent opponents of the state.

The process of making arrangements to decentralize power can create incentives for politicians to promote accommodation among groups and build coalitions across ethnic lines in the competition for political office and at every branch and level of government. Federalism, a type of decentralization, "proliferates the points of power and so makes control of the center less vital and pressing."

Some calls for autonomy can be satisfied through symbolic recognition of traditional leaders.

Weaknesses

Decentralization policies can reduce ethnic conflict tensions, but can also generate conflict. Federalism, a form of decentralization, can promote secession or partition and even greater intolerance toward the minority groups left behind. Elements of central government are bound to object to losing power to local government; this can produce short-term instability.

Where the government is highly centralized, the potential gain from political office is exceedingly high relative to the returns from other economic sectors, raising the stakes in potentially losing or gaining that power and aggravating political competition and ethnic struggles. Regional governments established through decentralization might call for reducing central ministries’ powers which these entities are likely to resist. Devolution of power to units larger than a district or province may be perceived as threatening to smaller minorities in areas where larger minorities would likely dominate the territory both economically and politically.

Shifting administrative and political burdens to the regional level during a decentralization process can increase competition between regional groups at the local level.

Devolution and other policies to counter separatism may foster the very secession they aim to prevent.

Lessons learned

Decentralization and local government capacitation are fundamental requirements for managing ethnic, regional (particularly highland-lowland divergence), and religious differences and are important prerequisites for genuine democratization. Devolution of power creates a wider space within which broader participation during elections and in post-/pre-election political life can develop and arrangements for greater power-sharing can evolve. A genuine process of decentralization helps produce locally-owned decision-making and development capacity, critical to mitigating conflict over divisive issues such as resource use.

Devolution agreements are difficult to reach and once reached, often abort. Small regions may secede. In the long run, though, decentralization can help build confidence among minority interests within the state. While insufficient on its own to create trust between parties, a decentralization process can establish a basis for positive interaction between former adversaries.

Effective decentralization must go beyond administrative decentralization. Successful decentralization depends on the performance of negotiators, endorsements for decentralization by political elites, and political leaders maintaining political credibility in each region after decentralization takes place.

Decentralization of power is challenging to manage because it can have unexpected consequences. Decentralization programs should incorporate procedures to evaluate and adjust the program during its implementation through a monitoring and evaluation system to identify developing frictions and formulate responses.Designers of decentralization in a country in ethnic conflict must decide whether to attempt to use homogeneous or heterogeneous states in conflict reduction, and how much power to devolve; the answers, one observer says, will depend on which of the underlying mechanisms of conflict reduction stands the best chance of functioning in a given environment. If groups are territorially separate and sub-ethnic divisions are prominent, the case for creating ethnically homogeneous states instead of ethnically heterogeneous states is strong (although a homogeneous state does not preclude sub-ethnic cleavages). "Bottom-up" approaches to decentralization work best to reduce ethnic conflict.

It is important to use caution when promoting any political changes which involve constitutional reform, such as federalism, and to be sure to consider how ethnic issues will be affected by the changes. Successful decentralization of power requires that the central government, opposing groups, and donors organizing the arrangement understand the essential conflict issues.

References and resources

Timothy D. Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1996).

Saul Newman, Ethnoregional Conflict in Democracies (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996).

Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1985).

Heather McHugh.

Donald Rothchild.

Donald Rothchild and Victor A. Olorunsola (eds..), State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1983).