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Tool Category D: Economic and Social
Measures
14. Development Assistance
Description |
Development assistance (DA) is aid from bilateral or multilateral donors to central government, local governments or non-governmental structures in another country to carry out socio-economic and/or political development. Aid can take the shape of transfers of money or goods or sponsorship of projects or programs. This profile focusses on DAs role in conflict prevention and mitigation. | |
Objectives |
Development programs aim to improve an areas overall socio-economic situation or address root causes of communal violence directly or to help avert a return to violence in the aftermath of a conflict. | |
Expected outcome or impact |
Depending on the project, DA reduces violence by improving a populations socio-economic welfare or addressing other root causes of conflict. | |
Relationship to conflict prevention and mitigation |
DA can remove, lessen
or counter the source or catalysts of conflict both
directly and indirectly.
DA can be targeted to specific at-risk areas, either in the early stages of violent conflict to prevent greater violence, or to mitigate ongoing conflict, or post-conflict to focus on reconstruction in an attempt to prevent the recurrence of violent conflict. At the same time, DA can provoke violence.
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Implementation Organizers |
Foreign aid providers
include official multilateral organizations such as the
World Bank (IBRD) and its affiliated International
Development Association, the Asian, African, and
Inter-American Development Banks, and the International
Monetary Fund. Multilateral groups involved more at the
project level include such entities as the UN Development
Programme (UNDP) and UNICEF. There are a myriad of
international Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) and
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) involved in
development. Donor government agencies include the US
Agency for International Development (USAID), the
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA),
Germanys Gesellschaft für Technische
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Britains Overseas Development
Administration (ODA), Frances Coopération
Française and many others. Donors can channel funding through bilateral organizations, PVOs, or multilateral organizations. There are also regional and national organizations in recipient regions and countries: IGAD, ECOWAS and SADCC are three prominent African regional organizations. Local NGOs are proliferating in recipient countries and are attracting increasing amounts of bi- and multilateral aid. DA activities can be initiated by any of the above parties. They can be funded bilaterally or multilaterally, with joint support from the beneficiary or without matching funds. Projects can be controlled by the donor or implementor, either totally or in partnership with a national government or private entity, or in some cases are controlled partially or totally locally. |
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Participants |
Participants in DA include the government, multilateral organizations, NGOs, and sometimes donor agencies themselves. | |
Activities |
Development assistance
encompasses a broad range of activities, from grassroots
work with local communities such as agricultural
extension or primary health care to large infrastructure
projects, political development programs and balance of
payments assistance. Even in individual sectors,
development assistance runs the gamut from local,
community-based initiatives to macro-economic
interventions at the national level. Programs designed to increase growth, income and/or employment. This category encompasses the vast majority of DA programs, often targeting specific, underdeveloped sectors, such as agriculture, infrastructure or political institutions. These programs generally do not aim directly at conflict prevention per se; a conflict prevention or mitigation component must be built into such programs. To reduce the potential for conflict, donors, planners and implementors must:
Investment promotion and commerce. Economically weak, ethnically diverse regions are often prone to violent ethnic conflicts. In regions and communities populated by ethnically, regionally or politically non-dominant groups, directing investment toward such measures as infrastructure improvements, health clinics, improvements to transportation networks to link non-dominant group areas, job training and education programs can help alleviate tensions. Commercial interests which benefit from stable investment climates can become strong advocates of conflict prevention. DA directed towards increasing commerce between communities and promoting export opportunities could increase beneficiaries vested interest in defusing conflicts. Business, employment or education opportunities. DA can sponsor programs such as education and training programs, employment incentives, preferential treatment and business incentives including investment, business licenses, contracts and loans to discriminated or under-represented groups. Affirmative action programsquotas for hiring, preference in government jobscan benefit a weak, non-dominant group or an under-resourced region. However, this can also increase conflict, especially in the short run, as dominant groups or other non-recipients feel threatened or left out. Reducing incentives for military recruitment. Socio-economic needs often drive people to join armies and militia. Investment in home regions of militia members with DA that creates opportunities for productive livelihoods might draw back some members back to their home areas and enable democratic, peaceful elements to compete for the loyalty of young men at risk of being lured into engaging in violence. Efforts to ease rural poverty, reduce the isolation of rural areas, and integrate rural people into national life would make it more difficult for grievances to fester in remote areas and reduce the attractiveness of resistance armies or militia. Programs that explicitly target root causes of the conflictcauses such as access to resources, corruption, political or economic mismanagement, lack of political access, absence of legal recoursecan deliberately seek to increase communities stake in the absence of violence through increased trade or promoting joint cooperate ventures. DA can also be conditioned to policy changes to reduce conflict. Appropriate DA includes promoting investment, generating alternative employment, land settlement or reform programs, programs aimed at increasing access to opportunities for non-dominant groups (women, indigenous populations or other minority ethnic groups), and sustainable development programs (health, education, family planning, water and sanitation, roads, ports, agriculture, livestock, or resource management, cooperation, or conservation programs). Where violence is already present it may be difficult to draw a clear line between development assistance and humanitarian assistance. The distinction often depends on participating agencies level of follow-through to the projects, the capacity they develop to sustain projects after donors departure, and the degree of community participation they solicit. In conflicts with a strong ethnic component, assistance to affected areas can address causes by focussing on transforming relationships between ethnic groups by supporting education, legal system reform, civil society development, employment generation and post-conflict projects or programs aimed at reconstruction and peacebuilding. DA can proactively reduce regional and ethnic tensions and avoid widening those divisions by designing aid programs for needy beneficiaries in a target area, as opposed to targeting a particular group. To avoid accusations of regional or group favoritism, DA should not be limited to areas where a particular group dominates, and beneficiary criteria should be open and transparent. Cross-line/intercommunal programming. DA can be programmed in many ways to bring hostile communities together to cooperate with one another in various sectors and perhaps help forestall escalation of hostilities.
Addressing the economic roots of conflict. Donors can use DA to address the economic disruptions at the root of many complex emergencies. At the local level, conflicts arise more frequently over resources than ethnicity, especially as concerns water, grass and land use. DA agencies should specifically work to understand traditional uses of natural resources and how communities apply their own laws and mechanisms to resolving conflicts as part of planning development interventions. At the sub-national level, where local resources fuel tensions, aid can address some of the igniting factors, and aid agencies have a comparative advantage in addressing such conflicts given their day-to-day proximity.
Programs that address conflictual behavior itself include supporting conflict resolution and conflict management programs or initiatives, developing mediation mechanisms, democratic development, and judicial/legal reform. Expenditures in this last category are dwarfed in dollar terms by other DA expenditures, yet they are rapidly increasing as donors place more emphasis on civil society development, democratization and conflict prevention and resolution activities. Incorporating conflict prevention/resolution into assistance. Development agencies operating in conflict areas should take steps to gain thorough knowledge of conflict issues in their operating areas and of potential conflict prevention/resolution initiatives. DA agencies include issues of peacebuilding and reconciliation in programming and develop clear, systematic principles for operating in conflict areas and for avoiding exacerbating conflict. DA agencies should explicitly consider the impact of programming on actual or potential conflict, from program content, beneficiaries and location to implementation staff. |
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Cost considerations |
Budget requirements vary according to the scope and objectives of each set of activities. The longer the results horizon, the more complex the financial commitment: long-term development costs are not necessarily greater but require multi-year commitments. | |
Other resource considerations |
DA can require equipment, staff and technical assistance; these resources are tailored to each project. For DA interventions to incorporate conflict prevention in planning, design, and implementation, people should be consulted who are familiar with the local conflict situation and who are experienced in integrating conflict response and monitoring components into development programs. | |
Set-up time |
Set-up time for effective DA depends on how long it takes to plan the activity and integrate the conflict prevention component into the program and objectives. Quick-impact projects that aim to revitalize local communities and "jump-start" peace can be implemented fairly rapidly, especially once the implementing agency is established on the ground. | |
Timeframe to see results |
DA yields short- and long-term results on local conflicts. | |
Conflict context Stages of conflict |
DA projects and programs
addressing a conflicts socio-economic causes can be
initiated prior to violent conflict. Post-conflict
programs might be aimed at reconstruction, peacebuilding
and reconciliation. Typically, few traditional DA activities occur during a conflicts acute phase, often because of poor security, absence of counterparts, or implementing agencies institutional requirements. Many experts encourage DA practitioners to engage during times of conflict; some point out that violence subsides for prolonged periods or in certain geographic areas in even the most violent conflict, and that these moments of reprieve should be used for DA to help draw combatants away from the conflict. |
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Types of conflict |
Localized conflicts with roots predominantly in competition over resources are the best candidates for interventions which seek to resolve the underlying resource-driven tensions. | |
Causes of conflict |
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Prerequisites |
Preconditions for
successful DA vary and generally include minimal
security, working counterparts at the local level, good
governance at the macro level, including redistributive
social policies, sound economic policies and accountable
political government, and donor commitment to mid- and
long-term goals. DA can address operational or structural causes of conflict depending on the type of intervention undertaken and the approach used toward conflict prevention. |
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Past practice Within the Greater Horn |
Southern Sudan. CRS funds
a community cooperative in Chukudum to increase their
purchasing power. The cooperative in turn buys goods from
neighboring communities, stimulating exchange between the
Boya, Didinga, and Toposa, who have historically raided
each other for cattle or grain. With the help of some agencies and donors, cooperatives and other local producers in Western Equatoria, sell surplus production, opening up old trade routes, some of which cross borders. Somalia. Checkpoints on the road from Boraama to Hargeisa in Somaliland were in place because people all along the road needed money to buy water from the limited number of usable water points. When UNDP dug two additional water holes, the checkpoints disappeared. The fighting over water points in Bakool Region in the spring and summer of 1995 between the Jiron and Hadame sub-clans was amenable to resolution through elder negotiation backed up by agency support for the eventual agreement provision of digging additional water points. |
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Outside the Greater Horn |
Angola. USAIDs
Office of Transition Initiatives is implementing
Community Revitalization Projects (CRPs) in areas that
were particularly hard-hit by the conflict. The grants
target small-scale, labor-intensive community-initiated
activities, such as road-building, well-digging,
bridge-rehabilitating, the provision of agricultural
inputs. The aim is to empower local social structures and
revitalize traditional economic patterns, thereby
ensuring that these communities have a stake in the
peace. "Jump-starting" normalcy draws young men
away from the conflict, creating an alternative and a
disincentive to further fighting. Bosnia. The European Unions Administration in Mostar (EUAM) has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on infrastructure, utilities, small-business development and civil society strengthening to reunite the towns divided communities and forestall further conflict between Bosnians and Croats. Although Mostar remains very polarized, renewed fighting has not erupted. |
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Evaluation Strengths |
DA can be programmed to
address the root causes of conflict rather than its
symptoms. DA is a versatile tool that can target social, economic, political and cultural issues related to conflict within a community or a country.DAs long-term horizon and incremental approach can help build political will with conflicting parties as well as with international actors who might otherwise be reluctant to engage in a process they might view as problematic. DA has sometimes shown success in buying political good will on the part of hard-liners who might otherwise want to resume conflict. Thoughtfully programmed DA can draw people away from conflict by offering alternatives to violence. This can be sometimes be done during the conflict ("spot reconstruction") or in the wake of the conflict when societies are often most prone to renewed violence (community revitalization projects). |
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Weaknesses |
DA is not conflict-neutral
and cannot by itself resolve or forestall complex
conflicts. DA progress can be hampered by slow economic
growth, armed conflicts, weak host government
capabilities, failure to implement needed policy and
institutional reforms, natural disasters, a poor
investment climate, and donor administrative
requirements. There can be disagreement over whether donors should channel aid to non-governmental organizations or to governments. Critics charge the external resources provided to NGOs weaken state structures and lead to greater fragmentation. Proponents point out that local NGOs are important civil society institutions, and as civil society is relatively weak in many less developed countries, support for NGOs can be a good thing for these societies over and above the specific programs that NGOs carry out. If not carefully planned and implemented, DA can be ineffective or even harmful to conflict prevention. DA can undermine indigenous development, create dependency, prop up corrupt regimes, favor certain classes or groups at the expense of others, or allow leaders forego compromise, postpone needed economic reforms or waste the countrys own resources on unproductive expenditures such as excessive military spending or engaging in war against internal enemies. Using foreign assistance to contain an explosive situation can become its objective rather than addressing the causes of the conflict. Projects can be ill-chosen and exacerbate regional, class, or ethnic resentment or strengthen authoritarian regimes. By giving only a glimpse of a better life without providing full access, aid can create resentment and exacerbate radicalism. Land reform programs to secure access to land by particular groups may inadvertently increase ethnic tensions. Recipient countries to absorb outside money and to undertake technical projects efficiently may be limited. DA can be siphoned off by corruption or wasted on poorly conceived development schemes. In situations of conflict, insecurity, limited access, problems with or absence of central authorities and lack of local counterparts can inhibit DA results. The relatively modest sums contributed through DA programs in some cases may be powerless to address the economic causes of certain conflicts.Offering preferential treatment in business opportunities or employment programs may cause a backlash from the groups left out. Economic incentives have a slightly higher likelihood of motivating private and public sector organizations to improve the access of non-dominant groups to the job market. |
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References and resources |
Cuny, Fred and Victor
Tanner, "Working with Local Communities to Reduce
Conflict: Spot Reconstruction," in Disaster
Prevention and Management Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1, UK,
1995. Dorrnbos, Martin et al. (eds.), Beyond Conflict in the Horn: The Prospects for Peace, Recovery and Development in Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan, The Red Sea Press, Trenton, NJ, 1992. Macrae, Joanna. and Anthony Zwi (eds.), War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies, Zed Books/SCF-UK, NJ and London, 1994. |