Conference Summary
Stabilization and Reconstruction: Closing the Civilian-Military Gap

Panel IV: “The Non-Governmental Perspective: How to Move beyond Speaking Past Each Other

The first panelist to speak on this subject pointed out that NGOs work side by side with the military around the globe, e.g. the Tsunami relief efforts and in the Balkans. However, there is a need for heightened dialogue concerning the appropriate role of NGOs.  For example, the panelist asked for more clarity concerning the core competencies of the different agencies and NGOs and their different missions and practices.  There is also the problem of coordinating different objectives: short term “hearts and minds” vs.” long term sustainable development.”

For example, one strength of NGOs is the ability to facilitate community engagement in grants programs. You get vastly different results when you tell people what to do, and when you enable the community to choose. Without space for community involvement, a fundamental piece of the puzzle is missing.

The second panelist noted that civil-military relationships are being built well below the strategic level: they are built locally and are quite site-specific. He cited the Alternative Livelihoods project in Eastern Afghanistan where relationships with three PRTs vary widely, and these differences are explained by varying local security conditions.

The third panelist noted that in Iraq we are not in a post-conflict situation.  Rather we are in the middle of the conflict and appropriate activities have to focus on that fact.  Essentially, in such a period NGOs have to lean heavily on the military.

This panelist also noted some “lessons learned” that need to be kept in mind for S/R:

1. Utilize standing organizations. It is not so important to agonize over the “right” organization to carry out activities.  As the panelist put it, any plan will work as long as it is executed vigorously, so take the organization you are going to use and lean on it.
   
   
2. The best expertise is local expertise. We saw this in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq and we are slow to recognize this and bring the locals on. We need to get as many local civilians involved as possible.
   
   
3. There is a need for “strategic patience.” There are times when things must be done in a rush.  However, when this is done there are usually second and third order effects that negatively impact the mission. Thus, we need to look carefully at metrics and creatively measure success.
   
   
4. Cultural awareness is critical and without that it will be difficult to effectively work with local talent.
   
   
5. Communications need to be considered strategically. A lot of great things happen at the grass roots level, and these need to be communicated to the international audience and to the local audience, which may be even more important.

The third member of this panel emphasized that there are three lessons that we have known for a long time and that we ignore them at our peril:

1. Establish Primacy. Putting a failed state back on its feet inevitably is a messy, difficult process. Nothing works without a permissive environment. Until then it should be a military (but not politically blind) endeavor. What NGOs are there for is to take people to a place they can’t get to on their own, and that is a political process.

2. Make Policy. Stabilization is not a policy. It is an essential pre-condition but it doesn’t in itself accomplish anything and it is not sustainable.   For example, rehabilitating Umm Qasr is not a policy. Rehabilitate the port, so that a certain amount of humanitarian relief can come through (x bags of flour). Clear just enough wharf and just enough conveyers. Get the rail going and mills and power for the mills and the bakeries and the fuel for the bakeries and keep reminding yourself that centrally managed economies are the worst kind except when you’re in charge. And this starts to become a policy. A policy is to rehabilitate those roads and bridges that facilitate return of ethnically cleansed populations, and put tolls on those roads so you can start to collect some revenue for the state. NGOs will find their place in the framework IF your policy is clear.

3. Act urgently. We all know that is takes 5, 10, or 15 years to rebuild, repair, rehabilitate, to create that new polity that can go on and resolve disputes without hurling hand grenades at each other and is no longer in need of constant refereeing. However, we never go into the field with a 10 year mandate. Typically we have 2 years, maybe 2 and a half so we have to demonstrate to the American people that sending our troops to provide the permissive environment was a good idea and that the demands we are making on them will decline. We also have to show the politicians that the policy will be politically sustainable.

One panelist raised some objections to specific military/civilian cooperative activities.  For example, having NGOs participate in PRTs inhibits NGOs from doing what they do best. Also, allowing military personnel to take tours of duty with NGOs is problematic because it compromises the NGOs’ humanitarian space.

 

 

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