Conference Summary
Stabilization and Reconstruction: Closing the Civilian-Military Gap

Panel III: Tailoring the USG Civilian Response: How to Keep Up with the Military

The first panel member to address the question pointed out the necessity of developing a solid operational plan.  However, he noted that the first question is: who creates that operational plan? He made a strong case that creating an office to oversee joint interagency cooperation would not work.  As he put it, under the USG structure, that function can only be carried out by the National Security Council.  As he put it, “It’s central under NSC or it’s a failure.” The line of authority should run to the NSC though the ambassador. When implementation is done from Washington it is too abstract and too bureaucratic.

An operational plan needs realistic assessments of time and cost in order to assess whether making the commitment is worth while. If we determine that it is worth while, the approach is not to “fix” the failed state. Rather, fix the countries around the failed state. Isolate the failed state, and do not become involved in unrealistic challenges.

This participant emphasized tough-minded realism. For example, we have to work through local military and police as soon as we can and build the local economy. This means not using large US contractors to try to transform the economy according to American rules. This is a recipe for civil-military failure.

This participant also argued that we need to move the money into the country as quickly as possible, and US contracting laws are an impediment to this. As he put it, “We can’t make things work with the way the laws and procedures are written today, but this isn’t what policy makers want to hear.”  Changing this would take 5-10 years.

Finally he argued that large central compounds like the Green Zone are counterproductive. Instead we should create small, secure functional environments.

This means maximum reliance on U.S. government personnel doing the work under the CORDS model.

The second panelist emphasized the need for clarity in who the participants really are and thus who can potentially carry out which mission.  Rhetorically asking “Who are ‘We’?” he went on to point out that lack of clear delineations made for problems in implementation in Afghanistan.  As did a number of other participants, he also talked about the need for effective leadership, especially the tendency of not giving leaders on the scene appropriate authority to accomplish the mission.  He also stated that, “In theater, we need a first among equals.”  Finally, this participant noted that we are not clear about nation building vs. state building.

The third panelist pointed out that the US has a rich history of success in post conflict reconstruction, having done it successfully in places like El Salvador, Poland, Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria.

In order to carry out effective S/R, we need greatly expanded and enhanced personnel resources. For example, we need to have a standing capability to enable a response in as little as 48 hours. This civilian reserve corps would be a standing group of USAID and State Foreign Service Officers. While it would be a small cadre of people, they would be highly trained and would be available to be pulled off other assignments. Such a cadre would need extra compensation—the panelist estimated at least a 20% addition to regular pay scales to be ready to go in 48 hours and willing to stay at post for 1 year.

Such a capability and cadre would need to be authorized by legislation along Goldwater-Nichols and Lugar-Biden lines. The panelist pointed out the legislation should also mandate the financial resources and went on to note that the operating budget for S/CRS and USAID are inadequate.

The panelist also noted that without indefinite quantity contracts, it would have been impossible to work in conflict zones.  This mechanism would hopefully be expanded into a combined function of USAID and S/CRS, with standing IQCs for personnel/logistics, security, democracy and governance, economic growth, and construction.

 

 

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