Conference Summary
Stabilization and Reconstruction: Closing the Civilian-Military Gap
Panel I: The Role of the U.S. Military in Stability Operations: Opportunities and Challenges
The panel addressed the overall topic under 5 more specific questions:
- Do we have a means for rating effectiveness of civil-military coordination?
- What is the military role in stabilization and reconstruction efforts?
- What are ways we can improve coordination of military- civilian operations?
- What is the military skill set for conflict and post conflict?
- How to develop that in short term and the long term?
One panel member, a veteran of Iraq, noted that he was not fully prepared with the skills he discovered that he needed, especially cultural and linguistic skills. He believes, however, that the American army is adapting fairly rapidly to the demands of counter insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan and it is starting to internalize those lessons. A new field manual on counterinsurgency is coming out with the Army War College leading the drafting effort; this is a sign that the Army and Marine Corps are starting to internalize and institutionalize this learning. Emphasize area-specific intelligence, language and cultural skills.
Richard Downie, author of “Learning from Conflict” wrote about the institutional learning cycle. With the end of the cold war, ethnic conflicts have increased and these are the main arena of conflict. We need a new way of doing business, and the most difficult step is convincing the organization that the new way is needed. Successful learning organizations accept input from the bottom up and develop doctrine locally on the ground.
The US military is a learning organization: the army has set up training centers locally to teach specific lessons learned. The training academy in Iraq specializes in theater-specific learning for new soldiers in Iraq and the US-based academy covers more general counter insurgency topics. Officers are sent back and forth between the academies and active duty.
Marine General Victor Krulak said, “You cannot win militarily. You have to win totally, or you are not winning at all.” This panel member noted that we don’t have the number of DOS Foreign Service Officers and CIA Officers needed to cover the vast theater. The State Department is very small. He stated that the military should use its credibility on the Hill to get these resources to support the entire effort. The Defense Department has not paid enough attention and it’s clear that a whole lot more learning needs to be done inside DOD.
Another panel member pointed out that there are two basic approaches to war on terrorism. In their most pure forms they are (1) stability operations that concentrate on the society, and (2) combat operations that focus on the enemy. This basic choice of approach is important because it determines the tactics, training, outlook, and even the definition of success. These two approaches are probably best seen in the case of Afghanistan where US strategy clearly has shifted from counter terrorist, enemy-centric to counter-insurgency, population-centric stability operations.
Participants in this panel brought up the stark contrast between the resources available to the military and civilian sectors. This concern was echoed in other contexts as well. Basically the military’s personnel, financial, and logistical assets dwarf those of the civilian players, largely DOS and USAID. Under these circumstances, it is important for the military to be as close to the civilian leadership as possible so that the efforts of the civilians are not swamped by military considerations. For example, in Afghanistan, the relationship between the military commander and the US Ambassador was unusually close, including locating the commander’s office in the US embassy compound. Physical co-location of the two most senior individuals paid enormous dividends in terms of resolving problems that could not be solved without direct contact between the senior officials on the scene.
This panel member also pointed out a cultural friction between the military and civilian (here DOS) practice. The military has a culture of planning whereas at State, the culture is anti-planning; improvisation is their forte. This split can lead to problems and it would be best to have much greater involvement of Foreign Service officers in military planning exercises to avoid misunderstandings.
A member of the first panel pointed out that the question of whether it is a good thing for the military to become heavily involved in the stabilization effort has not been permanently answered. For the time being, the DOD has said yes. However, the issue of whether stabilization and reconstruction efforts are a good thing for the military to focus on will reemerge after the Iraq involvement winds down and potentially during and after the 2008 Presidential election. This panel member outlined two points supporting a heavy involvement of the military in stability operations and three points questioning that involvement:
Strategic case FOR increasing the military capabilities in S/R:
1) Stabilization and reconstruction have become an absolutely vital task in today’s strategic environment because that environment is so interconnected. As former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has said: “In today’s global village, chaos is an infectious disease.” US cannot ignore internal wars. Indeed, we cannot stay out of them. The US must contain problematic internal wars to ameliorate and address root causes of wars as part of our own security interests.
2) The US military may not be the best means to carry out this activity, but it is the best alternative among the candidate institutions the US has. The military has the best array of resources and is best able to develop capacities to deal with complex, time-sensitive situations.
Strategic case AGAINST increasing the military capabilities in S/R:
1) America’s involvement in terrorist-related conflicts is transitory. Iraq is showing American society just how expensive it is to transform societies and ameliorate root causes of terrorism. Faced with these costs, the US may say, “We don’t want to do this- we don’t want to try to transform societies anymore.” The US may go back to the model we used in Yugoslavia: undertaking an initial operation, but then handing off responsibility off to multinational forces.
2) There is extensive opportunity cost. The time the military spends learning S/R is time not spent doing other things that may be important. If this is a concern, we should design an institution specifically for S/R rather than redesigning the military. In short, rather than trying to fit a round peg in a square hole, let’s develop a square peg.
3) If the military runs the S/R effort it will become overly militarized. Generally speaking, we do not want greater militarization; stabilization calls for demilitarization. Probably the most effective way to do stabilization is to have a very constrained, delimited role for the military as we did in the early 1990s.
This panel member also pointed out that conflict prevention is more effective if done multi-nationally. The US can take the lead in creating regional centers to develop concepts and to train other countries in how to respond to emergencies before they happen. This makes for more effective responses and response capabilities.
Another panel member pointed out that the role of civilian casualties in terrorism-related war is important. In fact, the success of military operations largely depends on civilians’ good will. The military’s formative experience was in two world wars and the cold war. So clearly S/R is not its forte and will take time to transform. For example, NATO in first 10 years wasn’t much, but today it is a complex and potent organization.
The military needs time to develop these new capabilities. The new Directive 3000.05 says that US forces have two missions: combat operations and stability operations. That is a very profound change which reflects the new reality. Before this, any soldier could sum up the mission in one sentence: Close on the enemy and destroy it. Solutions in counterinsurgency are inherently interagency and DOD has become better able to deal with USAID and other agencies and NGOs.
National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD 44) was written jointly by DOS and DOD, and gives civilians the lead role in reconstruction issues. While that is as it should be, the panel member also noted that if other departments cannot deploy sufficient capabilities DOD will inevitably pick up some of those responsibilities. This understanding has not yet permeated the Hill. It will take about 15 years to get serious change. The US will have to move from beyond the concept to budget realities and a legal structure that supports it.
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